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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of international migration in the Asia-Pacific 
region and reviews internal migration in China.  After putting Asia-Pacific migration in a global 
context, it reviews trends in migration and the impacts of migrants in the major migrant-
receiving countries, patterns of migration and their development impacts in migrant-sending 
countries, the human development impacts of migration, and three policy issues, viz, new 
seasonal worker programs for Pacific Islanders in New Zealand and Australia, required local 
sponsorship of foreigners in the Gulf countries, and the economic effects of migrants in the US 
and Thailand.  Recent trends in internal migration in China, which shares attributes of 
international migration because of the hukou (household registration) system, are also assessed. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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Asia-Pacific Migration in a Global Perspective 
This section puts migration in the Asia-Pacific region in a global context and explores the major 
reasons why migration in the region is likely to increase before it decreases.  The major points 
include: 
 Asia is different in both perception and reality. One perception is that, just as some Asian 
countries managed to achieve very rapid economic growth, some may succeed in 
managing labor migration more successfully than governments in other parts of the 
world; 
 Policies of migrant-receiving countries vary significantly, with the triangle of policies 
framed by Singapore’s welcome the skilled and rotate the low-skilled, Japan’s largely 
closed doors to low-skilled foreign workers, and the dependence of Gulf oil exporters on 
migrants to fill 90 percent of private-sector jobs; 
 Policies of migrant-sending countries are more similar, with many governments aiming to 
send more skilled workers to destinations inside and outside Asia and to measure the 
development impacts of migration using the single indicator of remittances. 
The Asia-Pacific region, home to almost 60 percent of the world’s people, is unusual in dealing 
with migration in three major respects.  First, there is a widespread sense inside and outside the 
region that Asia is different. There are many reasons, including the Asian economic miracle that 
catapulted several countries from poorer to richer in a relatively short time (World Bank, 1993).
1
 
This economic success may encourage some Asian leaders to believe that they can achieve 
another success in managing internal and international labor migration to achieve goals that 
include protecting migrants and local workers, enhancing cooperation between governments in 
labor-sending and –receiving areas to better manage migration, and ensuring that migration 
promotes development in labor-sending areas. 
Second, there is more diversity in national labor migration policies than in national economic 
policies.  The policy extremes can be approximated by a triangle. Singapore lies at one corner, 
                                                 
1
 The East Asian economic miracle stands in sharp contrast to the lack of similar African and Latin American 
investment- and export-led growth success stories. 
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welcoming professionals to settle with their families while rotating less-skilled foreign workers 
in and out of the country. Japan lies at another corner, allowing but not recruiting foreign 
professionals and preferring ethnic Japanese from Latin America as well as foreign trainees, 
students, and unauthorized workers to guest workers with full labor market rights.  The Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries represent a third corner, relying on migrants for over 90 percent 
of private-sector workers, requiring migrants to have citizen-sponsors, and recently announcing 
policies to cooperate with migrant-sending countries to assure returns. The contrast between the 
similar investment-intensive and export-led economic policies of East and Southeast Asian 
nations, and the dis-similar labor migration policies, is striking. 
Third, there appears to be convergence in the migration policies of labor-sending governments in 
the region.  Most want to send more workers abroad, to increase the share of skilled workers 
among migrants, and to diversify the destinations of migrants to include more European and 
North American destinations. To achieve these marketing, up skilling, and diversification goals, 
many Asian governments have established ministries or agencies to promote and protect 
migrants, with promotion accomplished by ministerial visits and protection via regulation of 
private-sector recruiters and pre-departure reviews of the contracts they offer to migrants.
2
  The 
evolving migrant promotion and protection infrastructure often assumes that development is a 
natural or inevitable outgrowth of sending more workers abroad, so that remittances can serve as 
the major indicator of migration’s development impacts. This may not be true. 
In 2005, Asian nations had about 48 million migrants, or a quarter of the 191-million strong 
migrant stock. The number of migrants in East Asia doubled between 1975 and 2005 to 6.5 
million, but East Asia accounts for less than 15 percent of Asia’s migrants. The number of 
migrants declined in south-central Asia, largely because of the shrinking number of persons 
resettled after wars for independence on the Indian subcontinent, and rose slower in southeast 
Asia than in East Asia. The most rapid growth in migrants has been in Western Asia, where the 
migrant stock almost doubled between 1970 and 1980, doubled again between 1980 and 1995, 
and increased by 40 percent in the past decade.  In 2005, almost half of the international migrants 
in Asia were in Western Asia, which includes the Gulf oil exporters. 
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 Despite the desires of many labor-sending countries, relatively few Asian migrants move under the terms of 
bilateral agreements and MOUs. 
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Table 1. International Migrant Stock, Asia and World, 1960-2005 (Mils) 
International Migrant Stock, Asia and World, 1960-
2005     
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Asia 28.5 28.2 27.8 28.0 32.1 37.2 41.9 40.4 44.4 48.1 
 Eastern 
Asia 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.7 6.5 
 South-
central 
Asia 18.4 17.7 16.9 16.1 16.6 18.6 19.7 15.6 15.0 13.2 
 Southeast 
Asia 3.6 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.5 4.8 5.7 
 Western 
Asia 3.8 4.4 4.5 5.8 8.8 11.7 14.9 16.3 19.0 22.7 
World 75.5 78.4 81.3 86.8 99.3 111.0 154.9 165.1 176.7 190.6 
 More 
Developed 32.3 35.4 38.4 42.5 47.5 53.6 90.4 101.7 110.9 120.6 
 Less 
Developed 43.1 43.0 43.0 44.3 51.8 57.4 64.6 63.4 65.9 70.0 
Asian 
Share 38% 36% 34% 32% 32% 34% 27% 24% 25% 25% 
Source: UN Population Division, DESA. POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2005 
The Pacific region or Oceania has a higher share of migrants among residents. Migrants were 15 
percent of residents in 2005, the highest migrant share among regions—North America was 
second at 13 percent.  In Micronesia, 24 percent of residents were migrants in 2005, followed by 
20 percent in Australia and New Zealand. 
Why People Migrate 
International migration is usually a carefully considered individual or family decision.  The 
major reasons to migrate to another country can be grouped into two categories: economic and 
noneconomic, while the factors that encourage a migrant to actually cross borders fall into three 
categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and networks.  An economic migrant may be encouraged 
to move by employer recruitment of guest workers, demand-pull, while migrants crossing 
borders for economic reasons may be moving to escape unemployment or low wages, supply-
push factors. 
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These factors are listed in the table below.  A worker in rural Indonesia may decide to migrate to 
Malaysia because a friend or relative tells him of a job, highlighting the availability of higher 
wage jobs as a demand-pull factor.  The worker may not have a regular job at home or face debts 
from a family member’s medical emergency, examples of supply-push factors that encourage 
emigration. Networks encompass everything from moneylenders who provide the funds needed 
to pay a smuggler to employers or friends and relatives at the destination who help migrants to 
find jobs and places to live.  
Table 2.  Factors Influencing Migration 
Factors Encouraging an Individual to Migrate 
Type of Migrant Demand-Pull Supply-Push Network/Other 
Economic 
 
Labor recruitment, 
e.g. guest workers 
Un- or under-
employment; low 
wages; e.g., farmers 
whose crops fail 
Job and wage 
information flows; 
e.g., sons following 
fathers 
Non-Economic 
 
Family unification; 
e.g., family 
members join 
spouse 
Flee war and 
persecution; e.g., 
displaced persons 
and refugees/asylum 
seekers 
Communications; 
transportation; 
Assistance 
organizations; 
Desire for new 
experience/adventur
e; 
These examples are illustrative. Individuals contemplating migration may be encouraged to 
move by all three factors.  The importance of pull, push, and network factors can change over 
time. 
Demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors rarely have equal weights in an individual 
migration decision, and their weights can change over time.  Generally, demand-pull and supply-
push factors are strongest at the beginnings of a migration flow, and network factors become 
more important as migration streams mature.   
The first migrant workers are often recruited by employers, and their presence is approved or 
tolerated by governments.  The demonstration effect of some migrants returning to their areas of 
origin with savings can prompt more people to seek foreign jobs.  Network factors ranging from 
friends and relatives settled abroad to the expectation that especially young men and women are 
5 
 
expected to seek opportunity abroad can sustain labor migration between poorer and richer areas 
within and between countries.  
Migration is often considered an investment with costs now and benefits later. Migrants move 
when the present value of the expected benefits of higher wages in the destination area exceeds 
the costs, which include the costs of moving, perhaps unemployment in the destination, and the 
costs of separation from family (Todaro, 1969). Once migrants are established abroad, they 
sometimes want their families to join them, which is why family unification is the most 
important non-economic motivation for crossing national borders.  Nautical metaphors are often 
used to explain how an anchor migrant may be a demand-pull factor for family migration, and 
the immediate family may be followed by parents and brothers and sisters in so-called chain 
migration.  
Some migrants cross national borders to escape political persecution at home.  The 1951 Geneva 
Convention defines a refugee as a person outside his or her country of citizenship who does not 
want to return ―owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.‖ Countries that sign the 
Geneva Convention pledge not to ―refuel‖ or return those recognized as refugees to places where 
they could be persecuted. (www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3b0280294.html) 
Most of the world’s 9.9 million refugees in 2006 fled to neighboring countries, where 
governments or UNHCR may provide temporary assistance.  Some of those living in refugee 
camps are resettled in third countries as immigrants to begin their lives anew. Other foreigners 
travel directly to the country in which they would like to resettle and request asylum, that is, they 
asked to be recognized as refugees and given an immigrant status. 
Most refugees are from developing countries and move to other developing countries, while most 
asylum seekers are from developing countries and move to industrial countries. In 2006, Pakistan 
and Iran were host to about 20 percent of the world’s refugees, most of whom were Afghanis, the 
top refugee-producing country. The United States was the third leading host of refugees, and the 
top five refugee-hosting countries had 40 percent of the total. The major sources of refugees 
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were Afghanistan and Iraq, a third of the total, followed by Sudan, Somalia, and Congo; these 
five countries produced over half of the world’s refugees. 
Table 3. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in 2006 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in 2006 
Top 5 Host Countries Number Top 5 Origin Number 
Pakistan 1,044,462 Afghanistan 2,017,519 
Iran 968,370 Iraq 1,450,905 
United States 843,498 Sudan 686,311 
Germany 605,406 Somalia  464,253 
Jordan 500,229 Congo 401,914 
Subtotal 3,961,965 Subtotal 5,020,902 
Total 9,877,077 Total 9,877,077 
Top 5 share 40%  51% 
Asylum Seekers (pending cases)  
Host Countries Number Origin Countries Number 
South Africa 131,107 Iraq 46,913 
United States 124,223 Congo 31,728 
Germany 52,807 El Salvador 28,783 
Austria 42,396 Myanmar 26,307 
France 39,571 Colombia 21,923 
Subtotal 390,104 Subtotal 155,654 
Total 740,165 Total 740,165 
Top 5 share 53% Top 5 share 21% 
Source: www.unhcr.org/statistics.html  
2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless 
Persons 
 
The sources of asylum seekers are more diverse. Only two of the five major-refugee producing 
countries were among the top five countries of origin for asylum seekers with pending cases in 
2006 (Iraq and Congo), and the top five asylum-origin countries accounted for only a fifth of the 
asylum seekers. It should be noted that in most industrial countries, fewer than a quarter of 
asylum seekers are recognized as refugees in need of protection, but more are allowed to remain 
because it is difficult to return them to their countries of origin, such as asylum seekers from 
Somalia. 
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Globalization, Differences and Migration 
People mover between areas to take advantage of differences—people move from colder to 
warmer climates, and from areas with lower wages to areas with higher wages. Globalization has 
increased linkages between countries, and made more people aware of differences between them.  
Capital and goods also flow between countries, and their growth has led to international and 
regional bodies to set rules for trade and investment. However, people are different from money 
and goods, and managing their entry and stay is a core attribute of national sovereignty. 
International movements of people are not governed by a comprehensive global migration 
regime and, with a few exceptions, by regional migration agreements.  Most nation states do not 
welcome newcomers as immigrants, but almost all countries that are richer than their neighbors 
have guest worker programs that allow local employers to recruit and employ foreign workers.  
Many also have significant numbers of unauthorized or irregular migrants.  
Most of the world’s people, and most population growth, occurs in developing countries.  The 
world’s population, which reached 6 billion in October 1999, is growing by 1.2 percent or 80 
million a year, with 97 percent of the growth in developing countries.
3
  In the past, significant 
demographic differences between areas sometimes resulted in large-scale migration.  For 
example, Europe had 21 percent of the world’s almost one billion residents in 1800 and the 
Americas four percent.  When there were five Europeans for every American, millions of 
Europeans emigrated to North and South America in search of economic opportunity as well as 
religious and political freedom. 
Table 4. World Population by Continent, 1800, 2000, 2050 (Percent shares) 
World Population by Continent, 1800, 2000, 2050 (Percent 
shares) 
 1800 1999 2050* 
World (mils) 978 5,978 8,909 
Africa (%) 11 13 20 
                                                 
3
 The average woman in developing countries has 3.5 children (excluding China), versus 1.5 children per woman in 
developed countries. According to the Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org), the world’s fastest growing 
population is in Gaza, where the population growth rate is 4.5 percent a year, and the fastest shrinking population is 
in Russia, where the population is declining by 0.5 percent a year. 
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Asia  65 61 59 
Europe  21 12 7 
Latin America & Caribbean  3 9 9 
Northern America  1 5 4 
Oceania  0 1 1 
Source: UN. 1999. The World at Six Billion, Table 2; *projected 
 
Will history repeat itself?  Africa and Europe have roughly equal populations today, but by 2050, 
Africa is projected to have three times more residents.  If Africa remains poorer than Europe, the 
diverging demographic trajectories of these two continents may propel young people from 
overcrowded cities such as Cairo and Lagos to Berlin and Rome.  
The Africa-Europe connection reflects demographic differences between continents. In the Asia-
Pacific region, there are also demographic differences between countries within the region that 
may prompt more migration. Asia includes population giants such as China and India, which 
together have almost 40 percent of the world’s people, and population dwarfs such as the Pacific 
islands of Nauru and Tuvalu with fewer than 10,000 residents.  Some of the world’s highest 
fertility rates are in the Gulf states, while Japan and Korea have some of the lowest fertility rates, 
raising questions about whether migration will serve as an equilibrating force for stark 
demographic differences. 
The economic differences that encourage international migration have two dimensions, one 
fostered by inequality between countries and the other by inequality within countries.  The 
world’s almost 200 nation states have per capita incomes that range from less than $250 per 
person per year to more than $50,000, a difference that provides a significant incentive for 
especially young people to migrate for higher wages and more opportunities.
4
 The 30 high-
income countries had a billion residents in 2005, a sixth of the world's population, and their gross 
national income was $36 trillion, 80 percent of the global $45 trillion.
5
 
                                                 
4
 Young people are most likely to move over borders because they have the least invested in jobs and careers at 
home and the most time to recoup their ―investment in migration‖ abroad. 
5
 Average per capita was $7,000 per person. At purchasing power parity, which takes into account national 
differences in the cost of living, the world's gross national income was $56 trillion or $9,400 per capita--$32,500 per 
capita in the high-income countries and $5,200 in low and middle-income countries. 
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The resulting average per capita income of $35,000 in high-income countries was 21 times the 
average $1,750 in low and middle-income countries.  Despite rapid economic growth in some 
developing countries, including East Asian ―Tigers‖ in the 1990s and China and India more 
recently, the 20-1 ratio in per capita incomes between high-income and other countries rose 
between 1975 and 2000 and shrank only marginally since then.  Average per capita incomes 
were 61 times higher in 2005 in high-income than low-income countries, and 13 times higher in 
middle-income countries. Within Asia, the average per capita income of $40,000 in Japan is 80 
times the $500 in Bangladesh. 
Table 5. Global Migrants and Per Capita Income Gaps, 1975-2005 
  Countries grouped    
 Migrants World 
Pop 
Migrants Annual 
mug 
increase 
by per capita GDP 
($) 
Ratio Ratio 
 
 millions billions World 
Pop 
millions Low Middle  High High-
low 
High-
Mid  
1975 85 4.1 2.1% 1  150 750 6,200 41 8  
1985 105 4.8 2.2% 2  270 1,290 11,810 44 9  
1990 154 5.3 2.9% 10  350 2,220 19,590 56 9  
1995 164 5.7 2.9% 2  430 2,390 24,930 58 10  
2000 175 6.1 2.9% 2  420 1,970 27,510 66 14  
2005 191 6.4 3.0% 3  580 2,640 35,131 61 13  
Sources: UN Population Division and World Bank Development Indicators; 1975 income 
data are 1976 
The 1990 migrant stock was  raised from 120 million to 154 million, largely to 
reflect the break-up of the USSR   
2005 data are gross national income        
 
These economic inequalities provide a powerful incentive for especially young people to move 
across national borders from lower to higher wage countries. Indeed, some argue that the best 
route to upward mobility for individuals is a work visa that enables migrants to cross national 
borders in search of higher wages (Clemens, 2008).  
International migration is likely to remain an option available to only a few workers. The world’s 
labor force of 3.1 billion in 2005 included 600 million workers in the high-income countries and 
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2.5 billion in the lower income countries.  Almost all labor force growth is in lower income 
countries: their labor force is projected to increase by almost 600 million between 2000 and 
2015, while the labor force in high-income countries is projected to remain stable at just over 
600 million. With projected labor force growth in developing countries about equal to the size of 
the labor force in industrial countries, migration from developing to industrial countries is likely 
to be an option for relatively few developing country workers. 
Table 6. World, DC, LDC Economically Active Pop (EAP) 1980-2020 (000) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
World EAP 1,929,556 2,160,150 2,405,619 2,604,941 2,818,456 
More Dev EAP 522,683 544,271 568,832 573,626 589,151 
Less Dev EAP 1,406,873 1,615,879 1,836,787 2,031,315 2,229,305 
 2005 2010 2015 2020  
World EAP 3,050,420 3,279,373 3,481,270 3,651,283  
More Dev EAP 604,521 613,388 611,392 602,977  
Less Dev EAP 2,445,899 2,665,986 2,869,878 3,048,307  
Change 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10 2010-20  
World EAP 25% 21% 17% 17%  
More Dev EAP 9% 5% 4% 5%  
Less Dev EAP 31% 26% 21% 20%  
Source: ILO Laborite, http://laborsta.ilo.org/   
 
 In lower income countries, 40 percent of workers are employed in agriculture, a sector that is 
often taxed despite the fact that farmers and farm workers usually have lower than average 
incomes.
6
  With taxes helping to keep farm incomes less than nonfarm incomes, there is often 
rural-urban migration, one reason why the urban share of the world’s population surpassed 50 
percent for the first time in 2008.
7
 
Industrial countries had ―Great Migrations‖ off the land in the 1950s and 1960s, providing 
workers for expanding factories, fueling population growth in cities, and adding to emigration 
                                                 
6
 Taxes are extracted from agriculture via monopoly input suppliers who sell seeds or fertilizers at high prices or via 
monopoly purchasers of farm commodities who buy from farmers at less-than-world prices and pocket the 
difference when the coffee or cocoa is exported. In the high-income countries, farmers’ incomes are generally higher 
than those of non-farmers, in part because high-income countries transfer funds to producers of food and fiber. 
7
 UNFPA. 2007. State of the World’s Population. www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/english/introduction.html 
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pressures.  Similar Great Migrations are underway today in many Asian countries, including 
China and India, an internal migration examined in greater detail below. 
Rural-urban migration has three implications for international migration.  First, ex-farmers and 
farm workers are most likely to accept 3-D (dirty, dangerous, difficult) jobs inside their countries 
or abroad.
8
  Second, rural-urban migrants often make physical as well as cultural transitions, and 
many find the transition as easy abroad as at home, as when rural Indonesians find adapting to 
Kuala Lumpur as easy as navigating Jakarta.  Third, rural-urban migrants get one step closer to 
the country’s exits, since it is usually easiest to obtain visas and documents for legal migration in 
the cities, or to make arrangements for illegal migration. 
Differences encourage migration, but it takes networks or links between areas to encourage 
people to move.  Migration networks are a broad concept, and include communication factors 
that enable people to learn about opportunities abroad as well as the migration infrastructure that 
actually transports migrants over national borders and the rights regime that allows them to 
remain abroad.  Migration networks have been shaped and strengthened by three revolutions of 
the past half century, in communications, transportation, and rights.  
The communications revolution helps potential migrants to learn about opportunities abroad.  
The best information comes from migrants established abroad, since they can provide family and 
friends with information in an understandable context.  Cheaper communications enable 
migrants to quickly transmit job information as well as advice on how to cross national borders 
to friends and relatives at home.  For example, information about vacant jobs on Malaysian 
plantations may be received in rural Indonesia before it spreads to nearby Malaysian cities.
9
 
Meanwhile, films and television programs depicting life in high-income countries may 
encourage especially young people to assume that the grass is greener abroad, or that migration 
will lead to economic betterment.
10
  
                                                 
8
 This is evident in Chinese coastal cities, where internal rural-urban migrants fill 3-D jobs, and abroad, where 
Chinese migrants are employed in industries that range from services to sweatshops. 
9
 These farm worker recruitment networks are examined in Rural Migration News. 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/index.php 
10
 Even if migrants know that movies and TV shows portray exaggerated lifestyles, migrants who find themselves in 
slave-like conditions abroad sometimes say that they did not believe that things in rich countries could be ―that bad.‖ 
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The transportation revolution highlights the cost of travel today compared to mass migration a 
century or two ago. British migrants unable to pay one-way passage to North American colonies 
in the 18
th
 century often indentured themselves, signing contracts that obliged them to work for 
three to six years for whoever met the ship and paid the captain.  Transportation costs today are 
far less, typically less than $2,500 to travel anywhere in the world legally, and $1,000 to $20,000 
for unauthorized migration.  Most studies suggest faster payback times for migrants today, so 
that even migrants who pay high recruitment or smuggling fees can usually repay them within 
two or three years. 
The communications and transportation revolutions help migrants to learn about opportunities 
and to cross national borders, while the rights revolution affects their ability to stay abroad.  
After World War II, most industrial countries strengthened the constitutional and political rights 
of people within their borders to prevent a recurrence of fascism, and most granted social or 
economic rights to residents in their evolving welfare states without distinguishing citizens and 
migrants.  
As migration increased in the 1990s, policy makers began to roll back especially socioeconomic 
rights for migrants in an effort to manage migration. For example, Germany included liberal 
asylum provisions into their postwar constitutions to avoid another situation in which refugees 
perished because other countries returned those fleeing persecution to Nazi Germany.  In the 
early 1990s, over 1,000 foreigners a day were applying for asylum in Germany, and the 
government distributed them throughout the country and required local communities to provide 
them with housing and food.  Over 90 percent were found to be not in need of protection, and 
there was a backlash that included attacks on foreigners (Martin, 2004a).  
The German government responded in three ways.  First, it required nationals of the countries of 
origin of asylum seekers such as Turkey to obtain visas, allowing pre-screening.  Second, it 
imposed fines on airlines bringing foreigners to Germany without visas and other documents, 
making travel to Germany for potential asylum seekers more difficult. Third, Germany and other 
European Union countries agreed to make it difficult for foreigners from ―safe‖ countries or who 
13 
 
transited through safe countries en route to Germany to apply for asylum.
11
  In this way, the 
constitutional protection of asylum was maintained, but the number of asylum applicants was 
reduced by making it harder to apply. 
The United States in the mid-1990s debated the cost of providing welfare or social assistance to 
legal and unauthorized migrants.  The free-trade agreement NAFTA was expected to speed up 
economic and job growth in Mexico, reducing Mexico-US migration (Martin, 1993).  Instead, 
Mexico-US migration surged during and after the early 1990s recession, prompting California 
voters to approve Proposition 187 in 1994 over the objections of almost all statewide political 
and opinion leaders.
 12
   
Proposition 187 led to a national debate over immigrant numbers and rights to social assistance. 
President Clinton and those who wanted to ―end welfare as we know it‖ argued that the number 
of needy migrants should be reduced in order to maintain the access of legal immigrants to 
welfare benefits.  However, employers and some migrant advocates argued that the better 
solution was to allow immigration to remain at high levels and reduce the access of needy 
immigrants to the social assistance that was fueling the backlash.
 13
 Employers and their allies 
won, and immigration remained high while welfare benefits were curbed (Martin, 2004b).
14
 
Balancing migrant numbers and migrant rights is a major challenge (Ruhs and Martin, 2008).  
Countries with the highest shares of migrants in their labor forces, such as the Gulf oil exporters, 
tend to extend few rights to migrants—it is very hard for a guest worker to win an immigrant 
status and naturalize in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.  Countries with fewer guest 
workers, such as Sweden and other countries that grant more rights to foreigners have relatively 
                                                 
11
 The goal is to prevent so-called asylum shopping, as when an asylum seeker from Turkey passes through Bulgaria 
and Romania en route to Germany and applies for asylum because conditions for asylum applicants and rates of 
recognition are better. Sylvie Da Lomba, 2004. The Right to Seek Refugee Status in the European Union. 
Intersentia. 
12
Proposition 187, approved by a 59-41 percent margin in November 1994, would have created a state-funded 
screening mechanism to ensure that unauthorized foreigners did not obtain state-funded services, including public 
school education. Its implementation was stopped by a federal judge, but some of its provisions were included in 
1996 federal immigration reforms. See http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=492_0_2_0 
13
 Details of the three US laws enacted in 1996 are at Migration News. 1996. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/  One 
provision that was eventually dropped from the final bill would have made legal immigrants deportable if they 
received more than 12 months of welfare benefits. In the late 1990s, the access of especially legal immigrants and 
children to some welfare benefits was restored. 
14
 Benefits to poor children and needy elderly immigrants were restored during the late 1990s economic boom. 
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few guest workers, in part because adherence to the equality norm makes migrant workers as 
expensive as local workers.  The numbers-rights trade off is apparent in World Trade 
Organization GATS negotiations when some developing countries argue that migrant ―service 
providers‖ should not have to earn the minimum wage in the destination country.   
Major Migrant-Receiving Countries 
This section explains migration patterns and policies in the major countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region receiving migrant workers. The major points include: 
 Most Asian nations receiving migrants have policies that aim to prevent migrants from 
settling, most do not consider migration essential for economic growth, and most do not 
want immigrants to change their culture and identity.  
 Migration policies in the major Asian receiving countries can be framed by a triangle, 
with countries such as Singapore welcoming foreign professionals to settle and rotating 
less-skilled foreign workers in and out of the country, Japan allowing the employment of 
foreign professionals but remaining largely closed to less-skilled foreign workers, and the 
Gulf countries dependent on migrants to fill most private sector jobs 
 With migration restricted and considered temporary, there are few institutions developing 
data and long-term migration options or promoting regional dialogues to improve 
migration management   
Migration from Asia to traditional immigration countries was largely blocked until mid-1960s, 
when policy reforms in Canada and the US eased entry for Asian professionals who were offered 
jobs by Canadian and US employers.  These professionals usually arrived with their families, and 
most quickly climbed the economic ladder. Indeed, a US analysis found that the earnings of 
foreign-born men caught up to those of US-born men of the same age and education within 13 
years, and thereafter exceeded the earnings of similar US-born men, suggesting that the extra 
15 
 
drive and ambition that prompts migration could expand the economy and raise average earnings 
(Chiswick, 1978).
15
 
Asian migration to traditional immigration destinations for employment and family unification 
has turned Asian nations a major source of immigrants in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the US. After the Vietnam War ended in 1975, a million Southeast Asian refugees were resettled 
in Canada and the United States, forging new migration networks that continue to add 
immigrants, mostly via family unification.  With affluence, more Asian students are studying in 
traditional immigration destinations. Many remain to work, and some eventually settle and form 
or unite families. 
Most international labor migration in Asia involves workers moving from one Asian nation to 
another for temporary employment. The first significant flows of workers in the Asia-Pacific 
region began after oil price hikes in 1973-74, when Gulf oil exporters turned to foreign 
contractors who hired foreign workers to build infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges.  
As the demand for labor shifted from construction to services, and from men to women, there 
were predictions that Arab migrants would replace Asians for language and cultural reasons 
(Birks and Sinclair, 1980). This did not happen. Indeed, despite efforts to ―nationalize‖ Gulf 
work forces by prohibiting foreigners from filling some jobs, migrant workers, most from south 
and southeast Asia, continue to fill over 90 percent of private sector jobs in most Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries. 
There is also migration from one nearby Asian country to another, as exemplified by Indonesian 
workers in Malaysia and Burmese in Thailand. Many of these migrants are unauthorized despite 
periodic legalizations. Policy in Malaysia and Thailand is in flux.  The Malaysian government 
has several times announced plans to reduce the employment of migrants, while the Thai 
government devolved more responsibility for managing migration to provincial governments. 
The only comparative data on migrant stocks by country over time is compiled by the United 
Nations (www.unmigration.org).  The data in table below include foreigners in a country at least 
12 months, and usually do not distinguish by legal status or purpose of migration. All countries 
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 Borjas (1994) re-examined Chiswick’s findings and concluded they applied to the unique set of circumstances that 
accompanied the lifting of barriers to Asian immigration in the mid-1960s. 
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except South Korea had increases in their migrant stock between 2000 and 2005, and the South 
Korean data are suspect--the Ministry of Public Administration and Security reported 747,000 
foreigners in 2005, but the UN reported only 551,000—the difference represents almost 200,000 
irregular foreigners.  Singapore and Japan recorded the sharpest rise in migrant stocks. 
Table 7. Migrant Stock in East and Southeast Asia, 2000-05 (000) 
 2000 2005 Change 
East Asia 5,769 6,497 13% 
China 513 596 16% 
Hong Kong 2,701 2,999 11% 
Japan 1,620 2,048 26% 
South Korea 597 551 -8% 
Southeast 
Asia 4,126 5,664 37% 
Malaysia 1,392 1,639 18% 
Singapore 1,352 1,843 36% 
Total 9,895 12,161 23% 
Totals include migrants in countries with fewer than 
500,000  
Source: United Nations, 
2006   
 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
The migration policies of the major Asian countries receiving migrants can be framed by a 
triangle.  At one corner is Singapore, which welcomes foreign professionals and their families to 
settle but seeks to rotate less-skilled migrant workers in and out of the country. There were about 
612,000 foreign workers in Singapore’s labor force of 2.1 million in 2000, making migrants a 
third of the work force (Yoho, 2007). The share of foreigners in Singapore’s work force has 
increased more than 10 fold since 1970, when it was three percent. 
The Singapore government welcomes ―foreign talent.‖ These professionals, mostly from China, 
India, and Malaysia, may arrive in Singapore with their families, achieve permanent residence 
status after two years, and become naturalized citizens after two more years. Less-skilled 
migrants, on the other hand, may not bring their families, are subject to removal if they become 
pregnant, and do not earn an automatic right to settle in Singapore even by marrying a 
17 
 
Singaporean citizen.  Employers of low-skilled migrants are subject to both dependency ceilings 
that regulate the mix of foreign and Singaporean workers and must pay a significant levy or tax 
on the wages paid to foreign workers.
16
  
The government believes that foreign talent is essential to Singapore’s growth and prosperity, 
and aims to entice Singaporeans abroad to return, to induce more foreign professionals to 
immigrate, and to raise fertility among more educated citizens. There are fears that the presence 
of ―too many‖ foreign professionals may make it more difficult for local professionals to get 
ahead, prompting former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew to remind residents that their resource-
poor country must compete on the basis of human capital. The government has expanded 
opportunities for foreign students to earn degrees in Singapore and remain after graduation. This 
makes foreign students probationary immigrants and shiftes some of the competition between 
foreigners and natives from the labor market to local universities. 
Hong Kong is another city-state with a welcome-the-skilled and rotate-the-unskilled migrant 
worker policy. As the financial and supply chain hub for southeastern China, the Hong Kong 
government has since 1999 allowed employers to hire foreigners with professional skills not 
available locally who are paid market wages (in the first decade, half of such migrants had 
PhDs).  Foreign professionals may arrive with their families and receive permanent residence 
status after seven years. 
Hong Kong, with seven million residents, is less welcoming toward low-skilled foreign workers, 
most of whom are domestic helpers from the Philippines and Indonesia. About 250,000 Hong 
Kong households have a foreign woman who provides child and elder care,
17
 but, unlike 
Singapore, Hong Kong has a minimum wage that requires domestic helpers to be paid at least 
HK$3,580 dollars ($460) a month in 2008; employers must also provide them with room and 
board.
18
  Between 2003 and 2008, employers had to pay a HK$400 a month retraining levy to 
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 Singapore does not have a minimum wage, so the employer-paid levy of up to S$470 ($310) a month for unskilled 
migrant construction workers can lower the earnings of foreign workers. Employers of foreign workers must also 
post a bond for each non-Malaysian foreign worker their hire. 
17
 In Hong Kong, the fertility rate is one, meaning that the average woman has one child in her lifetime; a third of 
women in their mid-40s have no children. 
18
Beginning August 1, 2008, the HK$400 a month levy that collects funds to retrain local workers was suspended as 
an inflation-fighting move. Wages and other rules for domestic helpers are on line at: 
http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/pub lic/wcp/FDHguide.pdf 
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generate funds to retrain local workers(not for domestic helper jobs).  Especially Filipino 
migrants in Hong Kong are well organized; they have organized protests against policies in the 
Philippines and in Hong Kong (www.unifil.org.hk).  
Taiwan in October 1989 allowed the entry of foreign workers to help complete high-priority 
infrastructure projects, including highways and subways, and this so-called open-door policy 
resulted in 3,000 migrant workers in Taiwan in 1991. Migrant workers soon spread to factories 
and later to private households as caregivers for children
19
 and the elderly, and by 2000, there 
were 326,000 foreign workers, making them about 10 percent of all workers in low-skill jobs. 
Migrants are entitled to at least Taiwan's minimum wage of NT$15,840 ($480) a month in 2007, 
but employers may deduct up to NT$4,000 a month for room and board, and most do. 
Most of Taiwan’s migrants are from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.  The 
migrants often complain about the high fees they must pay to the brokers who arrange their 
employment.  The maximum fee should be a month’s wages for each year of a worker’s contract, 
but many migrants report paying much more than eight percent—recruitment fees of 20 to 30 
percent are common.  Because of these fees, which are deducted from the migrant’s pay, some 
migrants can earn more as unauthorized workers, so they ―run away‖ from the employer to 
whom they have been assigned.  
By 2008, the number of foreign workers in Taiwan hit a record of 373,000, and half were in 
service jobs, eliminating the ―natural‖ end to their employment that was envisioned when 
migrants were seen as a temporary boost for priority infrastructure projects. The 125,000 
Indonesians are the largest group of foreign workers, followed by 85,000 Filipinos, 82,000 
Vietnamese, and 79,000 Thais. The government continues to worry about structural dependence 
on migrant workers, and the 2008-09 recession may provide a test of the theory that foreign 
workers can serve as a shock absorber that keeps local unemployment rates low.  
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 Taiwan has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, 1.1 in 2008 (www.prb.org). 
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Japan and Korea  
Japan and South Korea are homogenous societies largely closed to foreigners. In both countries, 
foreign professionals and the descendents of past Japanese emigrants are employed for long 
periods, but in Japan most of the low-skilled jobs held by foreigners involve unauthorized 
foreigners, trainees, or students, not guest workers. Korea in 2004 began to replace foreign 
trainees paid less than the minimum wage with migrant workers entitled to the minimum wage, 
but still has a large number of unauthorized foreign workers. 
Japan's 2005 census found two million foreign residents, 1.6 percent of the population. The 
foreigners included 600,000 Koreans, many of whom have been living in Japan for decades,
20
 
followed by 560,000 Chinese, 315,000 ethnic Japanese Brazilians and 195,000 Filipinos.  The 
foreigners in the Japanese labor force include Koreans, descendants of Japanese who emigrated 
to South America and have returned to Japan, and foreign students and trainees.  The trainees, 
most from China, usually have three-year contracts that tie them to a particular employer and 
initially pay workers half of the minimum wage.
21
  
Filipina entertainers have dominated among legal foreign workers. Some 82,741 entertainer visas 
were issued to Filipina women in 2004, but only 8,606 in 2006, as the Japanese government 
responded to criticism that many of the entertainers became prostitutes. There were 21,054 
unauthorized foreigners at the end of 2007, down sharply from 149,785 at the end of 2006. 
Many Japanese leaders want the government to open doors wider to migrant workers, but most 
Japanese in opinion polls oppose especially low-skill immigration. Such foreigners, many of who 
overstay tourist and other visas in order to work in Japan, are often associated with crime, which 
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 Koreans in Japan in 1965 were allowed to become Japanese citizens, live as foreigners in Japan, or return to 
Korea—600,000 were living as foreigners in Japan in 2008. 
21
 Chinese trainees employed on Japanese farms typically earn $775 a month for seven months, but pay $2,700 of 
their $5,425 earnings to the Chinese agency that places them in Japan.  After a year as a trainee in Japan, foreign 
trainees are allowed to work for two additional years as workers entitled to the minimum wage. At a March 9, 2008 
rally in Tokyo, the leader of the Zen-tooitsu Workers Union said that many Chinese workers during years two and 
three earn 300 to 500 yen an hour ($3 to $5), less than the minimum wage of 630 yen an hour. The Chinese workers 
are considered "perma-temps" (permanently temporary), which means that they do not receive unemployment and 
health insurance.   
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is sometimes sensationalized in the press.
22
 Ex-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed the 
feelings of many Japanese toward low-skilled foreigners in 2005 by saying: ―Just because there 
is a labor shortage does not mean we should readily allow [migrants] to come in.‖ (quoted in 
Kashiwazaki and Akaha, 2006). 
Low fertility means that without immigration, the population of Japan will shrink. There were 85 
million Japanese aged 15 to 64 in 2005, but the working age population is projected to fall to 72 
million by 2025.  Japan has shifted much of its productive capacity abroad (an estimated 40 
percent of the productive capacity of Japanese capital was outside the country in 2006), and is 
debating whether to open itself to front-door immigrants to stabilize the population and labor 
force, admit side-door guest workers who would be expected to leave after several years, or keep 
migration doors mostly closed and persuade Japanese workers to work longer and more 
productively.  Then-Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008 said that Japan "needs to work out a 
policy in order to actively accept increasing numbers of immigrants,‖ but he acknowledged that 
many Japanese associate foreigners with crime and fear that immigration would lead to social 
unrest. 
The New York Times profiled Japanese-Brazilians near Toyota City, emphasizing that half of 
the residents of a 40-unit public housing complex with almost 9,000 residents were foreigners.
23
  
In the complex, Japanese-Brazilians adults rarely mix with local Japanese, and many Japanese-
Brazilians children do not go to Japanese schools because of language difficulties— only a third 
of the 33,000 Japanese-Brazilian children between five and 14 in Japan are in Japanese public 
schools, and many in those schools are receiving remedial Japanese language instruction. 
Employed Japanese-Brazilians earn an average $12 an hour at suppliers to Toyota; in one seat-
belt factory, they are a quarter of the labor force.  Employers consider the Japanese-Brazilians 
good workers, and say they could not operate without them.  
In 1908, Japanese began emigrating to Brazil to work on coffee plantations around Sao Paulo, 
and today there are 1.5 million ethnic Japanese in Brazil, the largest Japanese community outside 
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 Most of the 200,000 visa overstayers in 2008 were from the same countries as most of the foreigners living in 
Japan, Korea, China, and the Philippines. The Chinese seem to arouse the most fear. Norimitsu Onishi, "As Its Work 
Force Ages, Japan Needs and Fears Chinese Labor," New York Times, August 15, 2008 
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 Norimitsu Onishi, ―An Enclave of Brazilians Is Testing Insular Japan,‖ New York Times, November 2, 2008 
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Japan.  Some 317,000 Japanese-Brazilians have moved to Japan since 1990, and most can live in 
Japan indefinitely.  
Japanese-Brazilians report that their Japanese neighbors do not make them feel welcome, with 
shop owners sometimes following them around in stores to prevent shoplifting. Japanese 
sometimes move out of housing blocks as Japanese-Brazilians move in, and many Japanese-
Brazilian children drop out of school.  On the other hand, there are examples of Japanese and 
Japanese-Brazilians mixing in sports and school, but overall the experience with Japanese-
Brazilians raises questions about the ability of Japan, as currently structured, to integrate 
foreigners. 
Korea made one of the world’s most rapid transitions from sending workers abroad to receiving 
migrant workers. The number of Koreans in Gulf Cooperation Council countries rose from 395 
in 1974 to 162,000 in 1981, as the Korean government encouraged Korean construction firms to 
bid on contracts to provide jobs for Korean workers who were laid off as a result of the recession 
induced by higher oil prices in the mid-1970s.  Korean workers earned $750 a month for 48-hour 
weeks in the Gulf, and remitted $1.4 billion in 1981 (Kapur and McHale, 2006, 175). The 
experience gained by Korean firms and workers in the Middle East was soon applied to large-
scale infrastructure projects in Korea in the 1980s. 
Economic growth turned Korea into a net importer of labor by the early 1990s. South Korea in 
1991 allowed employers to bring foreigners to Korea as trainees—the theory was that they would 
apply their newly learned skills in Korean-owned factories abroad.  However, small and mid-
sized manufacturing firms offering so-called 3-D jobs—dirty, dangerous, and difficult found it 
hard to recruit Korean workers, and by 1993 the trainee program became a system for such firms 
to employ foreign workers in Korea who did not expect to be employed in Korean firms when 
they returned to their countries of origin.  The trainee system expanded from manufacturing to 
construction and agriculture, and the number of trainees rose sharply. 
The Korean government recognized that the employer-run trainee system was leading to abuse of 
workers and rising unauthorized migration. Many employers retained migrant workers’ passports 
and withheld wages in an effort to discourage them from running away and earning more as 
22 
 
illegal workers, while other foreigners arrived as tourists and worked illegally. The government 
responded to the runaway issue in 2000 by allowing trainees who completed their training 
assignments to remain for one year as workers entitled to the minimum wage. However, the 
number of unauthorized foreigners continued to increase, from 189,000 in December 2000 to 
255,000 a year later.
24
  
In July 2003, the Korean government decided to phase out the trainee system and replace it with 
the Employment Permit System. The EPS, administered by the government, began to admit 
foreigners as workers under bilateral agreements in 2004, and will be the major way foreign 
workers can be employed in Korea after 2010. Under the EPS, migrants are considered workers 
entitled to the minimum wage of 3,770 won ($3.80) an hour in 2008,
25
 and employers with at 
least 20 workers must offer EPS-migrants at least 40 hours of work a week. EPS-guest workers 
are covered by pension, health, employment and workers compensation programs.  
Most Korean employers offer EPS migrants one-year contracts that can be renewed for another 
two years. After three years of Korean employment, guest workers are to leave Korea for at least 
a month before returning for a final three-year stint.
26
  Migrants earn less than Koreans, 
reflecting the fact that they are employed in lower wage sectors. 
The Korean government has signed agreements with 14 migrant-sending countries to regulate 
migrant worker selection and employment, including the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri 
Lanka, Mongolia, China and Indonesia.  In these countries, government agencies usually select, 
train, and deploy migrants, who must learn some Korean (at their own expense) before 
arriving.
27
 Some 72,000 foreign workers were admitted under the MOUs in 2007, and most 
arrived in debt because of pre-departure costs. 
Like Japan, Korea has a separate program for descendants of previous Korean emigrants, so-
called ethnic Koreans (Kim, 2008). There are an estimated two million ethnic Koreans in China, 
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In 2002, imitating a similar program in Japan, the Korean government allowed foreigners with Korean ancestry, 
mainly Chinese Koreans, to be employed as workers in Korea. 
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The minimum wage is scheduled to rise to 4,000 won an hour in 2009. 
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 A committee in July 2008 recommended that the maximum period of continuous guest worker employment be 
increased to five years. 
27
The Korean government can and does adjust the Korean language requirement to influence the number of migrants 
admitted, e.g. raising the requirement to reduce entries. 
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most descended from people who fled Korea during Japanese occupation earlier in the 20
th
 
century.  Ethnic Koreans in China who move legally to South Korea are given almost full rights, 
and some 300,000 were in Korea in 2008. Most fill 3-D jobs at the bottom of the job ladder but, 
because they speak Korean, ethnic Koreans are often preferred to southeast Asians in service 
jobs. 
The Korean Ministry of Public Administration and Security reported 891,000 foreigners in South 
Korea in May 2008, up from 723,000 a year earlier.  Almost 58 percent were Chinese, followed 
by 22 percent from Southeast Asia and four percent from South Asia. Foreigners are about 1.8 
percent of the 49 million residents of South Korea, and half are migrant workers, including 
438,000 legal guest workers and 58,000 irregular foreign workers. Another 144,000 foreigners 
are spouses of Koreans, and there were 58,000 children from international marriages in 2007. 
Marriage migration is increasing rapidly in South Korea. The National Statistical Office reported 
that 11 percent of Korean marriages in 2007 involved a foreign spouse, and that 40 percent of 
Korean men employed in agriculture, forestry and fisheries
28
 who married in 2007 took foreign 
wives, most of whom were from Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines.
29
 Surveys of these 
foreign spouses, many of whom live on farms with their husband's relatives, find rates of abuse 
from 10 to 30 percent, and the children of Korean farmers and foreign wives often lag in 
education because their mothers do not speak Korean. 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
The Middle East, which stretches from Western Asia to North Africa, includes countries 
uniquely dependent at the two extremes of the labor migration spectrum, sending workers abroad 
and relying on migrant workers fill jobs. After oil prices rose in the 1970s, migrant workers were 
employed in the Gulf oil-exporting states to fill the jobs created by the spending of higher oil 
revenues on infrastructure. Some Middle East countries are uniquely dependent on remittances, 
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 Unlike most industrial countries, labor force participation in rural Korea rose during the 1970s and 1980s in order 
to compensate for the rural-urban migration of Korean youth and the lack of migrants and foreign spouses.  
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 Rural Korean men who marry foreign women often go on week-long marriage tours in the women's country of 
origin. Some of the abuse reportedly stems from suspicions that their brides agreed to marry and move to Korea only 
to earn money to remit to their families at home. 
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including Palestine, and others both send workers abroad and receive migrants, including Jordan 
and Lebanon. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates had 15 million foreigners among 40 million residents in 2008, including 
seven million foreigners among the 27 million residents of Saudi Arabia.  Relatively few women 
work for wages in GCC countries, fertility is high, a third of the native-born population is under 
18—as a result, labor forces often increase by over three percent a year. For example, in Saudi 
Arabia, the average woman has four children, 38 percent of the population is under 15, and the 
labor force is increasing rapidly. 
GCC countries have had 30 to 40 percent foreign residents since 1975, with a range from a low 
of 20 percent in Oman to a high of over 80 percent in the UAE. Arabs fell from three-fourths of 
migrants in GCC states in 1975 to stabilize at a third after 1985. The Arabs include 1. 5 million 
Egyptians, 900,000 Yemenis, 500,000 Palestinians and Jordanians, and perhaps 300,000 
Sudanese. Kapiszewski (2006) explains the stable Arab share of migrants as reflecting the fears 
of governments that too many Arabs could be a security threat.
30
 Asian workers have been 
cheaper than Arabs, most arrive without families and few settle. 
The GCC countries have segmented economies and labor forces. Foreign- and native-born 
professionals operate the oil facilities that generate the region’s wealth, native-born workers fill 
almost all government jobs, and foreign-born workers fill most private-sector jobs.  Most oil-rich 
governments guarantee government jobs to natives, but rapid labor force growth may make this 
guaranteed-job policy unsustainable (Noland and Pack, 2007).  
Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters have attempted to "nationalize" their work forces by 
restricting an ever-lengthening list of private-sector jobs to natives.  So far, nationalization has 
not substituted natives for foreigners in many jobs, largely because native youth shun the private-
sector jobs filled by migrants as requiring too much work for too little pay. However, Saudi 
deputy labor minister Abdulwahed Al-Humaid in November 2008 said that Saudization would 
continue, and pointed to the success of the policy by noting that more Saudis are filling retailing 
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Kapiszewski notes that some Arabs regard borders imposed by colonial powers as artificial and expect the 
emergence of a pan-Arab state to share oil wealth. 
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jobs. The Saudi government is building six new ―economic cities‖ with the help of migrant 
workers that aim to employ Saudis in white-collar private sector jobs. 
In GCC countries, foreigners must have local sponsors (kafala) to enter or leave the country. 
Most households are allowed to employ five or more migrants to fill household jobs ranging 
from domestic helper to gardener to driver.  With sponsorships selling for $1,000 or more in 
migrant-sending countries, some households sell sponsorships for non-existent jobs. In this way, 
migrants may go into debt and arrive in GCC countries to find they are unauthorized. Migrant 
advocates have been critical of GCC governments as well as migrant-sending governments for 
not doing enough to protect migrants from the abuses of the sponsorship system (Human Rights 
Watch, 2004, 2008). 
Thailand and Mekong 
Thailand sends about 130,000 workers abroad each year, while attracting several hundred 
thousand migrants from neighboring countries. Thais leaving for overseas jobs are mostly from 
the poorer northeastern parts of Thailand, and many work in construction and manufacturing in 
Israel, Japan, and Taiwan. The migrant workers arriving in Thailand are concentrated in the 
richest parts of the country, Bangkok and the south, as well as in the provinces bordering 
Burma.
31
   
Thailand in 2006 had an estimated 1.8 million foreign workers, making them five percent of its 
work force. These migrants were concentrated by industry and occupation as well as geography, 
with most employed as laborers in agriculture and fisheries, construction, manufacturing such as 
garments, and domestic helpers. Thailand regulates migrant worker employment by requiring 
Thai employers to register the migrants they employ.  
Thailand signed MOUs with Burma, Cambodia, and Laos in 2002-03 to improve the 
management of labor migration. This MOU approach has so far failed to discourage 
unauthorized migration from neighboring countries, largely because the MOU with Burma, 
which accounts for 75 percent of the migrants, has not yet been implemented. The MOUs with 
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Cambodia and Laos, on the other hand, have led to sending-country government-imposed fees 
equivalent to 4-5 months wages in Thailand, far more than the cost of being smuggled into 
Thailand, about one month’s Thai earnings. 
Thailand made the transition from net labor exporter to importer in the mid-1990s. The number 
of Thai workers going abroad has been falling—148,600 left in 2004 and 129,000 in 2005—and 
more are going to OECD countries.
32
 
Table 8. Emigration of Thai Workers: 1997, 2001, 2005 
Emigration of Thais, 1997, 2001, 2005 
Destination 1997 2001 2005 
Middle East 17,662 18,724 19,803 
 Israel 10,780 11,256 7,843 
East Asia 114,976 100,550 63,718 
 Taiwan 100,910 90,358 53,881 
ASEAN 49,011 36,237 35,979 
 Singapore 17,770 21,351 10,968 
OECD & other 2,040 3,070 9,112 
Total 183,689 158,581 128,612 
Source: Chalamwong, 2006, Appendix Table 6 
 
Thai migrant worker policy since 1992 has required employers to register the migrants they 
employ or risk fines and the removal of their unauthorized foreign workers. Registration requires 
the payment of fees equivalent to a month’s Thai wages, and allows migrants to work for one 
additional year, making fees eight percent of earnings.
33
 Few migrants have a month’s wages to 
pay the fee, so most Thai employers pay registration fees and deduct them from migrant wages. 
This lowers take-home pay and encourages some migrants to ―run-away‖ from the employer 
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Los Angeles-based Global Horizons recuited Thai workers to fill jobs in Israel in the 1990s and recruited Thais to 
fill US farm jobs under the H-2A program and nonfarm jobs under the H-2B program. Global has been sued by 
federal and state authorities for violating rules that require employers to pay transportation and minimum wages and 
lost its license to operate as a labor contractor in several states. 
(http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1157_0_4_0) 
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In September-November 1996, Thai employers were allowed to register the migrants they employed for two years 
after paying a 1,000-Baht bond, a 1,000-Baht fee and a 500-Baht health fee. Initially, only employers in 7 sectors 
(agriculture, fisheries, construction, mining, coal, transportation, and manufacturing) and 39 of the 78 provinces 
could register migrants, but the number of sectors was expanded to include domestic helpers and several other 
occupations, and the number of provinces was expanded to 43. Some 323,123 migrants were eventually registered, 
88 percent Burmese, and 293,652 two-year work permits were issued. 
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who registered them. To prevent runaways, some employers keep the documents of registered 
workers, which makes even registered migrants vulnerable to police checks. 
In July-August 2004, all migrants and their dependents could register with the Ministry of 
Interior at no charge and receive temporary residence cards that allowed them to stay in Thailand 
another year. Some 1,284,920 migrants and dependents registered at the Ministry of Interior,
34
 
but only 1,122,192 went to government offices to be photographed. Employers paid registration 
fees for 849,552 migrant workers,
35
 but fewer migrant workers were re-registered in the 
following years, some 705,293 (including 76 percent Burmese) in 2006 and even fewer in 2007, 
despite reports of ever-increasing numbers of migrants.  The Mekong Migration Center (2008, 
51-52) emphasized that the 2006 registration initially required employers to pay a significant 
deposit for each migrant worker registered—the deposit requirement was lifted to encourage 
more registrations.
36
 
The Thai Ministry of Labor’s Department of Employment reported 2.8 million foreigners in 
Thailand in 2006, including almost 1.3 million migrant workers, 500,000 overstayers (from 190 
countries), 800,000 foreigners under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, and 
104,000 registered foreign professionals. The Mekong Migration Center (2008, 53) reported 
535,732 migrant workers registered under the registration program in 2006, including 91 percent 
Burmese, and 110,529 registered under the MOUs with Cambodia and Laos, half Cambodian 
and half Laotian. 
The table below shows the rising total number of migrants and the fluctuating number of 
registered migrants.
 37
 The share of migrants registered was 67 percent in 2000 and 85 percent in 
2003, and hasw been falling recently (the data are approximate, since the total number of 
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Those registering in 2004 included 921,492 from Burma, 183,541 from Cambodia, and 179,887 from Laos.  The 
total included 93,000 children under 15 and about 10,000 migrants over 60. 
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 The cost of a one-year work permit was 3,800 baht ($100), including 1,800 for a one-year work permit (plus 100 
for the card) and 1,800 for a health check and insurance. 
36
Employers were to pay a registration fee of 10,000 baht ($275) for migrants who had been registered before and 
50,000 baht ($1,340) for migrants being registered for the first time. Employers protested, the fee was waived, and a 
total of 220,900 migrants were registered between March 2006 and February 2007, including 94 percent who had 
been previously registered.  
37
The complexity of the registration process may discourage some migrants from encouraging their employers to 
register them.  A migrant who arrives after the registration period ends, or without proper proof of employment, can 
be detained and deported.  Migrant work permits tie workers to a particular employer, and migrants cannot leave the 
district of that employer without permission.  
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migrants is not known). Except in 2000 and 2003, the total number of migrants has exceeded the 
number of registered migrants, often by two to one.  
Table 9. Foreign Workers in Thailand, 1995-2006 
Foreign Workers in Thailand, 1995-2006  
 Registered Non-registered Total Registered% 
1995 293,652 406,348 700,000 42% 
1996 293,652 424,037 717,689 41% 
1997 90,911 870,556 961,467 9% 
1998 99,974 886,915 986,889 10% 
1999 99,956 563,820 663,776 15% 
2000 568,249 281,751 850,000 67% 
2001 409,339 558,910 968,249 42% 
2002 288,780 711,220 1,000,000 29% 
2003 849,552 149,848 999,400 85% 
2004 705,293 807,294 1,512,587 47% 
2005 668,576 1,104,773 1,773,349 38% 
2006 460,014 1,339,986 1,800,000 26% 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Nara PPT, 2006; Huguet, 2007. 
An additional 53,202 migrants were registered under the 
MOU in 2006; most were already in Thailand.  
 
As in Taiwan, migrant workers in Thailand seem to have changed from a one-time phenomenon 
into a structural feature of the labor market.  In 1997-98 the Thai government tried to open up 
jobs for Thais laid off by the financial crisis by not renewing the work permits of the 20,000 
migrant workers employed in rice mills were migrants. Mill owners complained that, without 
migrants, the mills would close and rice exports would fall (Thailand is the world’s largest 
exporter of rice).
38
 After a one-day ―strike,‖ the government reversed its position and allowed 
migrants to continue to be employed in rice mills. 
Thailand signed MOUs with Burma or Myanmar (June 2003), Cambodia (May 2003) and Laos 
(October 2002) to improve the management of labor migration and promote development in the 
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On July 5, 1998 an estimated 600 of 1,000 Thai rice mills closed because, the owners claimed, the government 
would not permit them to employ foreign workers. The estimated 20,000 rice mill workers, mostly Burmese, earned 
the minimum wage of $4 a day or $122 a month to carry bags of rice that weigh up to 100 kg or 220 pounds; the 
quota was to carry 200 bags a day. The government proposed that the mills raise wages and reduce the weight of the 
bags from 100 to 50 kg to attract Thai workers, some of whom said they would work in rice mills if the bags were 
lighter (Migration News, 1998. Migrants Can Stay. August, Vol 5. No 8). This effort failed. 
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border areas of its poorer neighbors. Under the MOUs, Thai employers get their need for 
migrants verified by Thai authorities, who transmit information on the number of migrant 
workers needed to sending-country governments, where private firms (Cambodia) or government 
agencies (Burma and Laos) recruit migrants to fill Thai jobs (Vasuprasat, 2007). Migrants are 
issued passports so they can receive entry documents at the appropriate Thai embassy or 
consulate before traveling to Thailand to receive two-year work permits that are renewable once. 
Migrants are to leave Thailand when their work permits expire, and receive in their home 
country the 15 percent of wages that were withheld in Thailand to encourage their return (these 
wages are forfeited if migrants do not return).
39
  
In December 2007, the Ministry of Labor reported that Thai employers ―needed‖ 1.2 million 
unskilled migrant workers for 2008, and that 546,272 migrants were registered (Mekong 
Migration Center, 2008, 59). The MOL allowed migrants who received temporary IDs in the 
2004 registration, but who did not have Thai employers register them for work permits, or whose 
employers did not re-register them, to register in order to fill the 650,000-worker vacancy 
legally.  Some 135,000 migrants were registered in February 2008, 93 percent Burmese. All 
work permits that have been issued to migrants in Thailand are scheduled to expire February 10, 
2010. 
The Thai government launched enforcement campaigns against illegal entry and employment 
after each regularization. Some 135,400 unauthorized migrants from Burma, Cambodia, and 
Laos were detected at Thai borders in 2006, including 52 percent Cambodians and 44 percent 
Burmese, and Thai authorities removed 95,000; there were 103,000 border arrests in 2005 and 
57,000 in 2004 (Vasuprasat, 2007, 10).  However, interior arrests of migrants rose fastest for 
Cambodians, up over 100 percent between 2005 and 2006, and almost a third for Laotians, while 
arrests of Burmese declined. The Royal Thai Police reported that it spent 852 million baht ($25 
million), 1.4 percent of its FY07 budget, to deal with illegal migration. 
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 This part of the MOU has not been implemented; many experts doubt that migrants will ever receive the withheld 
wages from their own governments. Under the Thai MOUs with Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, migrants may be 
liable for income taxes in both Thailand and their country of origin. 
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Table 10. Enforcement Indicators, Thailand, 2005-06 
Enforcement Indicators, Thailand, 2005-06 
Migrants 2005 2006 Change 
Border Arrests 102,780 135,428 32% 
Interior Arrests  236,722 336,033 42% 
 Burma 100,759 88,819 -12% 
 Cambodia 92,268 196,798 113% 
 Laos 34,565 45,148 31% 
 Others 3,130 5,268 68% 
Arrests in Thailand (Thais & Foreigners) 
 Employers 1,005 1,039 3% 
 Landlords 1,280 1,627 27% 
 Smugglers 2,305 2,626 14% 
Source: Vasuprasat, 2007, 11  
 
The Mekong Migration Center (2008, 129-30) emphasized that, even if they are registered, 
migrant workers in Thailand can be subject to arrest and removal because e.g. they are outside 
their designated area of employment. The center cited examples of registered Burmese migrants 
arrested and deported while participating in holiday celebrations too far from their place of 
employment. Copies of work permits are normally not accepted by police as proof of 
registration, nor are the receipts migrants receive after registering but before receiving their 
registration cards. Migrants emphasize that with employers often holding their registration cards, 
they can remain in jail after being arrested until their employer brings the cards to the police, a 
dependence on employers that discourages worker protests. 
Recruitment under the MOUs began in 2006, when Thai employers requested 51,100 Lao and 
17,500 Cambodian workers (Vasuprasat, 2007, 8). However, only 3,400 Lao and 600 Cambodian 
workers arrived under the MOUs in 2006 (an additional 1,400 arrived from Laos in the first 
quarter of 2007).
40
 Up to 10 percent of those recruited under the MOUs leave before their two-
year contracts are completed, but there is no system for recording why. Vasuprasat (2007, 12) 
suggested that the reasons for early returns include the fact that Thai employers advance travel 
costs (fly now and pay later in wage deductions) and that many migrants are farm workers not 
accustomed to the long hours they are expected to work in Thai factories.  On the other hand, 
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 Another 49,200 migrants already in Thailand received documentation of their nationality from Cambodian and 
Laotian authorities and work permits from the Thai government (Hugeut, 2007, 8-9).  
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some migrants assume they will have three to four hours of overtime every day, and are 
disappointed when there is less overtime work available. 
Relatively few migrants have come to Thailand under the MOUs because of time-consuming 
recruitment procedures and high fees.  In both Cambodia and Laos, migrants must obtain 
documents from local and provincial authorities and travel to the capital to complete the 
recruitment process, which can take three to five months. High fees are an even more significant 
barrier to legal migration. Cambodian migrants entering Thailand under the MOU must agree to 
have recruitment agency fees that average 20 percent of the first year’s Thai earnings (an average 
3,700 baht a month, derived from the minimum wage of 144 baht a day and 26 days of work a 
month) deducted from their pay and sent to the agency.
41
 These fees of $350 to $500 are far 
more than the typical $85 cost of being smuggled from Cambodia to Thailand, although some of 
the smuggled migrants may wind up isolated on fishing boats or pushed into prostitution 
(women) or begging (children). Some Cambodians use daily border crossing passes that cost 10 
baht ($0.35) to enter Thailand and then work illegally, especially if they have relatives in 
Thailand to find them jobs and provide shelter. 
Recruitment in Laos is also expensive. Laotian Prime Minister Decree 68/PMO allows the five 
authorized employment agencies, two of which are state enterprises, to charge legal migrants 15 
percent of what they will earn abroad in recruitment fees, and does not make clear if agencies 
may charge additional fees for passports, health checks etc. Thai employers advance half of the 
15,500 baht recruitment fee to Lao recruitment agencies and pay the other half once the migrant 
arrives in Thailand, and then deduct this fee from migrant worker wages (Vasuprasat, 2007, 9). 
Being smuggled from Laos to Thailand costs $60 to $85, about one month’s wages, compared to 
five to six months wages in fees for migrating legally.
 42
 
There are several unique features of migrant workers in Thailand: 
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Cambodians wanting to work legally in Thailand submit applications to the Ministry of Labor, and are matched 
with Thai employers by the 12 authorized private recruitment agencies. Cambodian migrants sign two contracts—
one with the recruitment agency and one with the Thai employer. 
42
 The Lao government sometimes fines the families of migrants who leave without the permission of the village 
authority Kip 300,000 ($30). 
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 Migrants are concentrated in the same sectors as in other migrant-receiving countries, 
viz, agriculture, construction, and some manufacturing and services, but Thailand has a 
higher share of Thai workers than migrants employed in agriculture (about 25 percent of 
migrants and 40 percent of Thais are employed in agriculture) 
 Migrants are especially concentrated in several sectors. About 15 percent are employed 
in fishing and fish processing, compared with less than two percent of Thais, and 14 
percent are employed in construction, compared to six percent of Thais. Over half of the 
domestic helpers in Thailand are believed to be migrants. 
 About 75 percent of registered migrants are Burmese, followed by 12 percent each from 
Cambodia and Laos. If current trends continue, there is little prospect for a natural end to 
emigration pressures in these countries of origin, as would occur if economic 
development and rising wages kept migrants at home.  
 Migrants are concentrated in Bangkok and southern Thailand as well as in Thai 
provinces that border Burma. Thailand’s poverty is concentrated in rural areas of the 
northeast. Some Thais from these areas who used to migrate within Thailand now work 
abroad, often in the same sectors that employ migrants in Thailand, such as agriculture 
and construction.  It appears that migrants from Cambodia and Laos pass through poor 
areas of Thailand to find jobs in Bangkok and southern Thailand.  
In most cases, migrants complement Thai workers, as when migrants on fishing boats increase 
the productivity of Thai boat captains, boat builders, and others in upstream and downstream 
industries. There may also be instances of substitution between migrants and Thai workers, as 
when construction firms hire migrants rather than Thais because the migrants are willing to work 
more hours at lower wages (Thai migrants often return to their farms for the harvest).   
Most analysis suggests that migrants fill jobs in Thailand that have become less desirable as 
Thais gain more options in a growing economy, including the option of migrating abroad. These 
jobs were not eliminated or restructured as a result of e.g. rising wages because migrants were 
available to fill them. In some cases, ―migrant jobs‖ were created by new foreign and domestic 
investments, some of which were subsidized by the Thai Board of Investments, most notably in 
agriculture and garments along the Thai-Burmese border. 
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Migrants are primarily young workers, in the age group that typically pays taxes rather than 
receives tax-supported services. The access of migrants to services for which they have paid (in 
registration fees), such as health care, is uneven because migrants may not know they are entitled 
to services and health care facilities may not have providers who speak their language.  
Education of migrant children and crime raise special concerns. Some migrants  have Thai-born 
children or have brought their children to Thailand. These children have been entitled to attend 
Thai schools since July 2005, and increasing numbers do, but there is no national count of 
migrant school children. Thailand does not allow Burmese-language or unregistered schools, but 
there are ―learning centers,‖ many operated by NGOs, that provide some schooling for the 
children of migrants in their own language. Funding is sometimes augmented with parents’ 
contributions. The centers often mix children of various ages in one room, which may limit the 
effectiveness of the schooling. 
Unauthorized or irregular migrants are employed in Thailand in violation of Thai laws. However, 
media reports of migrants committing crimes in Thailand are likely to leave a false impression 
that migrants commit a disproportionate share of crimes when in fact they are more likely to be 
crime victims. However, provincial governments have begun to react to fears that migrants are 
responsible for rising crime by imposing new restrictions on them. Phuket provincial authorities 
in May 2007 announced that the 32,000 registered migrants must register their mobile phones 
and are prohibited from riding motorcycles and leaving their accommodations at night.
43
 In 
Ranong, migrant workers are prohibited from gathering in groups of five or more unless they are 
working; similar restrictions on migrants were implemented in Tak, Chiang Mai, and other 
border provinces. 
The Greater Mekong Subregion includes the six countries that share the Mekong river, Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, Burma (Union of Myanmar), Vietnam and the Yunnan Province of China.  
There are about three million migrants among the 260 million residents of the region, including 
two-thirds in Thailand.  The Mekong Migration Center (2008) reviewed the evolution of migrant 
worker policies in the region, especially in Thailand, emphasizing that even migrants who are 
registered can be arrested and deported for ―technical‖ violations of laws and regulations.   
                                                 
43―Warm welcome for tourists doesn't extend to workers,‖  The Nation. May 1, 2007 
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The center recommended (2008, 177-8) that receiving-country governments abolish restrictions 
on the movement of legal migrant workers within them and prevent provincial governments from 
enacting laws and regulations targeting migrants to avoid giving police an excuse to harass them. 
The center recmmended that employers be prohibited from retaining migrant documents or that 
migrants be allowed to carry copies of their documents; if police encounter migrants with copies, 
migrants should be given time to provide originals before being arrested. Huguet (2008) 
recommended that Mekong-area governments legalize migrant workers and that labor-sending 
and –receiving governments cooperate to recognize migrant skills and reduce the costs of 
sending remittances over borders.  
Migrant-Sending Countries 
This section explains the factors motivating out-migration as well as the migration policies of the 
major labor-sending countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The major points include: 
 Many Asian nations want to send more workers abroad to reduce joblessness, generate 
remittances, and accelerate development. Many governments have created agencies to 
―market‖ their workers to foreign employers. 
 Migrant-sending governments are also concerned about the rights of migrants, and many 
have agencies to regulate recruiters, prepare workers for overseas jobs, and look after 
migrants while they are abroad 
 Most governments measure the benefits of migration by the number of migrants going 
abroad and the amount of remittances received. These measures may not reflect progress 
in human or economic development that will make migration unnecessary in the future. 
Philippines 
The Philippines sends more workers abroad than any other Asian country.  According to the 
government, there are 83 million Filipinos at home and eight million abroad, including 1.5 
million or 20 percent in the US.
44
 Filipino migrants remitted over $1 billion a month in 2007, a 
total $14.4 billion, equivalent to 10 percent of the country’s GDP; over half of these remittances 
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 PRB.org puts the Philippine population at 90 million in 2008, and a projected 150 million in 2050. 
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were recorded as coming from the US.  In recognition of the importance of migrants and 
remittances to the economy, the Filipino president welcomes some returning migrants at 
Christmas in a "Pamaskong Handog sa OFWs" (welcome home overseas foreign workers) 
ceremony.
45
  
Almost 1.1 million Filipinos went abroad legally to work in 2007, an average of 3,000 a day, the 
equivalent of seven 747s; a similar 1.1 million Filipino migrants were deployed in 2006 (POEA, 
2008). Some 811,100 were land-based, meaning they filled jobs on land, and 266,500 were sea-
based workers, manning the world’s ships. Most of the land-based migrants, 61 percent, had 
been abroad before, in jobs ranging from domestic helper to driver to construction worker and in 
countries from Saudi Arabia to Canada.
 46
 Filipinos are 30 percent of those who man the world’s 
ships. 
Table 11. Philippines: Migrant Deployments in 2006-07 
 2007 2006 
Total 1,077,623 1,062,567 
 Landbased 811,070 788,070 
  Rehires 533,098 489,528 
  Share 66% 62% 
 Seabased 266,553 274,497 
Destinations   
 Saudi Arabia 238,419 223,459 
 UAE 120,657 99,212 
 Hong Kong 59,169 96,929 
 Qatar 56,277 45,795 
 Singapore 49,431 28,369 
Source: POEA. Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration. 2008.  
Overseas Employment Statistics 2007. 
www.poea.gov.ph 
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 An account of the December 20, 2007 welcome is at 
www.devbankphil.com.ph/News/news_full.php?articleid=00350  
46
 Of the 811,000 land-based migrants leaving in 2007, almost 30 percent went to Saudi Arabia, 15 percent went to 
the UAE, and about six percent each went to Hong Kong, Qatar and Singapore— these five countries absorbed two-
thirds of the land-based Filipinos deployed in 2007. 
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President Marcos in 1974 issued Decree 442 to ensure ―the careful selection of Filipino workers 
for the overseas labor market to protect the good name of the Philippines abroad.‖ Decree 1412 
in 1978 discussed strengthening worker recruitment for local and foreign jobs ―to serve national 
development objectives.‖ The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was 
created in 1982 to promote the migration of workers and to protect them during recruitment at 
home and employment abroad.  
Over half of the migrants leaving the Philippines are women, and some are vulnerable to abuse 
in the private households in which they work.  In 1995, Flor Contemplacion, a Filipina domestic 
helper in Singapore, was hanged after killing another Filipina maid and a Singaporean child.
47
  
Philippine President Fidel Ramos was unable to win additional time to investigate the case, 
prompting the enactment of Republic Act 8042, the so-called Filipino migrant workers' Magna 
Carta, which obliges the government to take steps to protect migrants abroad.  
The POEA sends workers abroad, regulates private recruitment agencies, and checks the 
contracts that recruiters provide to migrants (www.poea.gov.ph) with a 243 million peso ($5.5 
million) budget and 508 employees in 2007 —its costs were 218 pesos ($5) for each migrant 
deployed.  The POEA directly sent 8,600 workers abroad in 2007, about one percent of the land-
based migrants, including 5,200 Filipinos to Korea; only the POEA can send workers to Korea. 
Israeli-Lebanon fighting in summer 2006 resulted in the return of Filipina domestic helpers who 
complained of mistreatment.
48
 The government responded with the "Supermaid" program that, 
beginning in January 2007, requires Filipina domestic helpers abroad to receive training in 
emergency health care before departure and to be paid at least $400 a month. The number of 
Filipinas deployed as domestic helpers fell sharply--there were 91,000 newly hired household 
service workers in 2006 and 40,000 in 2007. POEA suspects that some may leave as gardeners or 
other types of workers not covered by the $400 a month minimum wage, which may prompt a 
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The events surrounding this case are covered in Asia Week. 1995. A Death in the Family. December 29. 
www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/95/1229/feat3.html 
 
48
 Fighting between Israeli and Hezbollah in mid-2006 resulted in 6,000 Filipinos, mostly domestic helpers, being 
flown home; two-thirds were undocumented.  Between 1990 and 2005, migration to Lebanon was banned because 
of frequent mistreatment of domestic helpers.  That ban was lifted in 2005, and reimposed in 2006. 
37 
 
minimum wage for all Filipino workers going abroad, so that domestic helpers do not leave as 
gardeners or security guards. 
The Philippine government believes it is managing labor migration effectively, citing more 
workers leaving legally and fewer licensed recruitment agencies (agencies that violate rules are 
closed).  There were 1,363 licensed recruiters in 2007, including 1,010 land-based recruiters and 
353 manning firms that provide seamen to shipping companies.  The POEA, which has a hard-
to-enter, easy-to-go policy toward recruiters, requires them to post bonds of two million pesos 
($45,000) and to be jointly liable with foreign employers if the contracts of migrant workers are 
violated.  
Joint liability is a potential best practice to protect migrant workers. Philippine law makes 
Filipino recruiters jointly liable with foreign employers to fulfill the terms of the contracts signed 
by the foreign employer, the Filipino recruiter, and the migrant.  Migrants abroad often have 
limited access to redress for contract violations, but when they return to the Philippines, migrants 
can turn to POEA for assistance if there were violations of contract terms, and Filipino recruiters 
must pay judgments against the foreign employer. 
The Philippines deployed 50,000 workers to foreign jobs in 1975. The number rose to 500,000 a 
year in the late 1980s, and today tops the one million a year target set by the government for the 
2004-2010 period. The major debate among Filipino economists is whether labor out-migration 
will be self stopping, as migrants send home remittances that are spent and invested to fuel 
economic and job growth, or whether some migration will create conditions that lead to more 
migration. 
Remittances reduce poverty. Adams and Page (2005) find that a 10 percent increase in the share 
of migrants in a country’s population is associated with a 1.9 percent decrease in the share of 
residents living in poverty, defined as living on less than $1 a day, and that a 10 percent increase 
in the share of remittances in a country’s GDP is associated with 1.6 percent reduction in 
poverty. Yang (2008)  
found that remittances to the Philippines are primarily invested, and that the fall the peso relative 
to the dollar increased remittance investments in the Philippines, including in children’s 
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education and health. It should be emphasized that over half of Filipino remittances are from the 
US, which has fewer than 20 percent of Filipinos abroad, and that Filipinos in the US are 
primarily settled immigrants rather than temporary workers, as with Filipinos in Saudi Arabia, 
Hong Kong, and other Asian countries.  
Remittances can also reduce inequality.  However, most Filipino remittances accrue to wealthier 
households, mitigating any effects on narrowing inequalities (Rodriguez, 1998).  Indeed, poor 
non-migrants may be worse off because of Dutch disease, as remittances increase the value of 
the peso and shrink the number of jobs in garment and other export-oriented manufacturing 
industries.  Acosta et al (2007) found a Dutch-disease effect of remittances in El Salvador, that 
is, remittances reduced the supply of labor and increased the demand for nontradeable goods, 
which increased the value of the currency and shrank the export-sector.  The Philippines central 
bank in 2007 pointed to evidence of Dutch disease, including the appreciation of the peso, the 
loss of jobs in export industries, and a rising price of nontradeable to tradable goods, including 
housing.
49
   
The social effects of remittances are also uneven. The so-called complacency effect may reduce 
the work efforts of members of families with a migrant abroad. Pernia concluded that migration 
and remittances have very mixed effects on the Philippines, as the ―remittance windfall may 
have a moral hazard effect as the government softens in pursuing policy reform or improving 
governance while people are lulled into complacency, as appears to be happening in the 
Philippines.‖ (2008, 8)  Furthermore, he concluded that ―labor export cannot be relied upon as a 
policy for reducing poverty, redressing income inequality and, for that matter, fostering the 
country’s long-run development.‖ (2008, 21) 
A culture of migration reportedly prompts many children to plan to follow their parents abroad to 
work, and may lessen their interest in education and the local labor market.  Labor migration has 
been called a "civil religion," with teens considering where to go abroad, TV shows exploring the 
tensions associated with family separation, and the Central Bank displaying remittance numbers 
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 Ernesto B. Calucag, ―The symptoms of Dutch disease,‖ Business World, February 22, 2008. 
www.bworldonline.com/Research/populareconomics.php?id=0074 
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on a billboard at Christmas. Evangelist Rick Warren calls Filipino guest workers the Josephs of 
today, toiling in the homes of modern Pharaohs to liberate Filipinos at home.
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Indonesia 
Indonesia sent over 640,000 migrant workers abroad in 2006, mostly women to Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia to be domestic helpers in private homes. At least half of the outflow is 
unauthorized, as when Indonesians travel as tourists or slip into Malaysia by boat and use 
pilgrimage visas to travel to Saudi Arabia. Total remittances are believed to be at least twice 
officially reported remittances of $3.4 billion in 2006.  
Indonesia’s goal is to increase the number of migrants deployed in order to increase remittances, 
but migrant advocates say that the Indonesian government often looks at migrant workers as 
sources of taxes and fees. The Indonesian president, who has recognized that the recruitment 
process winds up overcharging migrants and encouraging illegal migration, ordered the creation 
in 2007 of a business-oriented government agency with 800 employees, BNP2TKI, to act as a 
one-stop shop for migrants that simultaneously promotes and protects Indonesian migrant 
workers (Ananta and Arifin, 2007). Many NGOs are sceptical that BNP2TKI can achieve this 
goal. 
Indonesia’s labor force was 111 million in 2005, including 100 million employed, with 44 
percent in agriculture,
51
 17 percent in industry, and 39 percent in services—unemployment is 11 
percent and underemployment 45 percent. The labor force is growing faster than the number of 
jobs—the labor force rose from 96 million in 2000 to 111 million in 2005, while employment 
rose from 90 million to 100 million (Soeprobo, 2006, Table 2.2).  
The gap between the 15 million additional workers and the 10 million additional jobs encourages 
out-migration. However, government efforts to increase deployments to a million a year have not 
succeeded.
52
 Deployments peaked at 503,000 in 1997, the year of the Asian financial crisis, and 
fell to less than 400,000 in 2004. Deployments rose in 2005 to almost 500,000, and rose again in 
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 Jason DeParle, "A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves," New York Times, April 22, 2007 
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Those employed in agriculture included 18 million unpaid family workers. 
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 ―Indonesia aiming to send one million workers overseas each year,‖ The Jakarta Post, January 26, 2006. 
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2006 to almost 700,000. The table, which deals only with legal labor migration from Indonesia, 
shows that over three-quarters of Indonesian migrants are deployed to Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Table 12. Indonesian Migrants by Destination, 1995-2006 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Saudi Arabia  43,451   115,209   116,844   151,288   131,157   114,067  
Malaysia  29,712   38,652   317,685   108,775   169,177   191,700  
Subtotal  73,163   153,861   434,529   260,063   300,334   305,767  
% of Total 61% 70% 86% 71% 70% 70% 
Total  120,603  220,162   502,977   367,526   427,619  435,219 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Saudi Arabia  103,235  213,603   169,038   203,446  150,235 307,427 
Malaysia  110,490  152,680   89,439   127,175  201,887 270,099 
Subtotal  213,725  366,283   258,477   330,621  352,122 577,526 
% of Total 63% 76% 88% 86% 74% 85% 
Total 338,992 480,393 293,694 382,514 474,310 680,000 
Source: Indonesian Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, 2007  
No Indonesians were deployed between March and May 2005  
 
Indonesians domestic helpers are paid less than those from other countries, e.g. Filipina domestic 
helpers in Hong Kong are paid 30 to 50 percent more than Indonesians.
53
 Men dominate among 
the relatively few Indonesians going to South Korea and Japan. 
Some 2.7 million Indonesians worked abroad in mid-2006, mostly in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Indonesian-Malaysian migration is sometimes compared to 
Mexico-US migration. Indonesia and Malaysia have a similar language, culture, and religion, 
and there was widespread migration from Indonesia to Malaysia during the colonial era. 
Malaysia’s 2001 Census found 1.4 million foreigners, half Indonesians, reflecting a well-
established Indonesian community.
54
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 Loveband (2004) describes how Taiwanese labor brokers ―sell‖ Indonesians as docile domestic helpers to clients. 
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East Malaysia, the states of Sabah and Sarawak, also have large numbers of Indonesian and Filipino migrants. The 
population of Sabah rose from 700,000 in 1979 to over three million in 2006, with much of the growth was due to 
immigration. Tighter border controls have kept some Indonesians in Sabah. Those with expired Indonesian papers 
and no Malaysian papers are essentially ―paperless.‖ 
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Many Indonesians go to Malaysia as tourists and work, or slip into the country on boats. Once in 
Malaysia, unauthorized Indonesians often live with friends or relatives in enclaves. The 
Malaysian press reports emphasizes problems associated with migrants, such as crime, but the 
Indonesian press complains that Malaysian papers do not report cases of migrants who complain 
to employers about unpaid wages being reported to the police.
55
 Malaysia has a 500,000 strong 
People's Volunteer Corps (RELA) to help enforce laws, including laws against unauthorized 
foreigners. RELA volunteers are allowed to enter workplaces and homes without warrants, carry 
firearms, and make arrests after receiving permission from RELA leaders. Migrant activists say 
that RELA volunteers are sometimes vigilantes, planting evidence to justify arrests of foreigners 
and using excessive force in their policing. 
If caught working illegally, Indonesians are detained under sometimes harsh conditions in 
Malaysia before being returned to Indonesia. Malaysia has periodic ―amnesties‖ that permit 
unauthorized migrants to leave with minimal or no fines and no detention, and some 340,000 
unauthorized Indonesians returned from Malaysia during the most recent amnesty at the 
beginning of 2005 (Many migrants do not return during these amnesties because they are owed 
back wages. If they return before collecting them, they are unlikely to ever be paid). The 
Indonesian government, in turn, prohibited the deployment of additional migrants to Malaysia 
between March 1 and May 31, 2005 (90 days) to improve its recruitment and deployment 
policies. When the deployment of Indonesian migrants resumed, only agents registered with the 
Indonesian Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (MoMT) could send workers abroad, and 
migrant contracts had to be checked by the MoMT to ensure that they were signed by migrants, 
Indonesian agents, and foreign employers.
56
  
More Indonesian women work as domestic helpers at home and abroad than in any other type of 
wage work. Under the 2006 Malaysia-Indonesia MOU covering domestic helpers, contracts are 
to specify the rights and obligations of migrants and employers, and employers may no longer 
withhold a portion of workers' wages until the end of the contract.  
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 Ardimas Sasdi, ―Our Migrant Workers, Heroes or Villains?‖ The Jakarta Post, May 15, 2007. 
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 For migrants going to the Middle East, sponsors also had to sign the contracts. 
42 
 
There are often large gaps between the theory of government protecting migrants and the reality 
faced by migrants. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has deplored the 
exploitation of migrants by government agencies and private agents, prompting the formation of 
the BNP2TKI agency. Yudhoyono was quoted in the Jakarta Post on August 30, 2006 asserting 
that Indonesian migrants ―deserve better service to obtain documentation from government 
offices to work overseas because the government could not give them any jobs at home. Upon 
their arrival home, they should be given the red carpet for their service in contributing to the 
country's foreign exchange.‖57 
Some government agencies obtain a significant portion of their revenue by providing the forms 
and assurances needed to go abroad legally, and airport inspectors allegedly charge departing 
migrants fees if these forms are not completed perfectly. Other inspectors collect fees and duties 
on goods brought back by returning migrants, who can dispute the fees only if they leave the 
goods in the care of the government, which they are reluctant to do. Private vendors reportedly 
overcharge returning migrants at Terminal III of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport near 
Jakarta, which migrants are required to use, with low exchange rates and fixed fares for transport 
to villages.  
The Indonesian Labor Exporters Association (Apjati) and the Indonesian Manpower 
Development Association (Idea) represent labor recruiters, and both associations complained in 
November 2006 about a new government policy that requires them to have minimum capital of 
Rp 3 billion and to deposit Rp 500 million ($55,000) with the government. Even after the latest 
simplification of government deployment procedures, recruiters say that migrants must deal with 
14 government officers, down from 43, and obtain documents from agencies that range from the 
village to the federal government.
58
  
The recruitment industry had revenues of $194 million in 2003, according to Ananta and Arifin 
(2007). It is not clear what will happen to recruitment revenues with the new National Board for 
the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers (BNP2TKI). The BNP2TKI, 
modelled on the Philippines POEA was created by Law No. 39/2004. Chapter 3 of the law 
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outlines the rights and obligations of migrants, while Article 9 obliges migrants to pay all costs 
of their recruitment and deployment. Chapters 10 and 11 set out penalties for violations of 
Indonesian laws governing labor migration, including jail terms of one to five years for 
recruitment violations, such as sending workers under age 18 abroad.  
The BNP2TKI is to be a business-oriented and decentralized one-stop shop that offers potential 
migrants accurate information about jobs abroad via the internet and enables them to obtain 
necessary certificates and passports at one location; migrant-paid fees are to cover its costs.  
Before going abroad, migrants are to obtain certificates from BLKs (training centers) that certify 
their skills and knowledge of the destination country. 
NGOs Migrant Care and Jakak say that the ongoing reforms of the recruitment system
59
 are 
largely top-down cosmetic changes rather than sincere efforts to protect migrants and reduce 
their costs. They note that many of the Indonesians who returned from Malaysia during the 
Spring 2005 ―amnesty‖ had to pay fees to Indonesian recruiters, as well as to both the Indonesian 
and Malaysian governments, in order to return to their Malaysian jobs as legal workers.
60
  High 
recruitment fees have been a problem for Indonesian migrants; it is yet not clear whether recent 
reforms have reduced them. 
Vietnam  
Vietnam is aiming to increase the number of workers it sends to foreign labor markets to 100,000 
a year by 2010. Before 1989, Vietnam had labor cooperation agreements with several East 
European countries, including East Germany, under which workers were sent abroad to repay 
debts incurred by the government. Since 1993, Vietnam has allowed and increasingly promoted 
labor emigration, and had 400,000 migrant workers in 40 countries in 2006, including 100,000 in 
Malaysia and 90,000 in Taiwan (Anh Nguyen, 2007, 3-6). 
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 Ford (2006, 2004) reported that NGOs and the Indonesian Migrant Workers' Union (IMWU) were taking the lead 
to protect Indonesians employed abroad. Traditional Indonesian unions have done relatively little for migrants 
employed outside the country. 
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Many Indonesians continue to go by ferry to Malaysia with tourist visas and then work.  So-called "project boats" 
take Indonesians from Batam in Indonesia’s Riau Islands for Rp3.2 million ($350) to Plunggur, where arrivals do 
not have to show that they have at least M$1,000 ($260) to cover the cost of their vacation. 
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Vietnamese migrants have some of the highest debts when they go abroad, often exceeding the 
earnings they expect in first year of typical three-year contracts.  As a result, up to 25 percent of 
Vietnamese migrants run away from the employer to whom they were assigned, since they can 
earn more as unauthorized workers than as legal workers with debt deductions from their wages. 
In response, the Vietnamese government has proposed punishing runaways when they return to 
Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese labor force of 44 million in 2005 was distributed as follows: 24.3 million in 
agriculture, 7.6 million in industry (including construction), and 10.8 million in services. Among 
southeast Asian countries, Vietnam has the highest share of women in the labor force, 78 percent 
of working age women were in the labor force; about the same share of men were economically 
active as in neighboring countries, 83 percent. Un- and under-employment is highest in rural 
areas, encouraging young people in rural areas to migrate to urban areas of Vietnam and abroad.  
Table 13. Economically Active Population (share of working age in labor force) 
Southeast Asia, Economically Active Population (% of working age pop) 
 1990 Latest Year 
 Female Male Female Male Year 
Brunei Darussalam  46 82 59 80 (2005) 
Cambodia  55 58 64 72 (2001) 
Indonesia  52 83 53 87 (2004) 
Lao PDR 71 69 85 83 (2003) 
Malaysia  48 85 46 80 (2005) 
Myanmar  46 77 49 80 (2003) 
Philippines  48 82 50 83 (2004) 
Singapore  53 79 57 78 (2005) 
Thailand  74 85 66 82 (2005) 
Viet Nam 79 86 78 83 (2004) 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2006   
(www.adb.org/statistics) 
 
Vietnam sent almost 80,000 workers abroad in 2006 and 85,000 in 2007; about a third were 
classified as skilled workers. The government has two migrant-worker goals: to send 100,000 
workers a year abroad, and to send more skilled workers abroad in order to generate more 
remittances and to enable migrants to better protect themselves. 
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Table 14. Stock of Vietnamese Migrants, 2006 
Stock of Vietnamese Migrants, 2006   
 Number Monthly Wages($) Runaways Jobs 
Malaysia 100,000 150-200  Construction, factories 
Taiwan 90,000 300-500 9-12% Construction,factories, domestics 
S Korea 50,000 450-1,000 20-25% Factories, ag 
Japan 19,000  27-30% Factories 
Subtotal 259,000    
Source: Anh Nguyen, 2007, 7, 12   
 
The major destinations for Vietnamese migrants include Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea, 
which received 26,700, 23,600, and 12,000 Vietnamese migrants in 2007, respectively, or almost 
three-fourths of those deployed. Earnings averaged $300 a month in Malaysia, $600 in Taiwan, 
and $850 in South Korea. Migrant-paid fees were $1,000 to go to Malaysia, including $700 for 
commission and placement fees, $3,200 to Taiwan, including $2,450 for commission and 
placement fees,
61
 and $700 for Korea, including $240 for Korean language training but no fees 
(van Tranh, 2008).  
Table 15. Vietnamese Migrants' Costs and Earnings, 2007 
 Malaysia Taiwan S Korea  
Number Deployed 26,706 23,600 12,200 
Costs (US$) 1,013 3,199 699 
 Passport/visa 18 79 63 
 Medical check 25 25 28 
 Travel cost 200 300 366 
 Language etc 60 45 242 
 Deposit  300  
 Comm fee 350 2,000  
 Place fee 360 450  
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So many Vietnamese domestic helpers, reportedly 45 percent, ran away from their employers that Taiwan 
suspended the entry of Vietnamese domestic helpers in January 2006. Vietnam, like Bangladesh and some other 
labor-exporting countries, worries that if too many of its citizens abandon the jobs they went abroad to fill, receiving 
countries will not accept Vietnamese migrants. 
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Earnings ($/mon) 300 585 850 
Earnings-3 years ($) 10,800 21,060 30,600 
Ratio-Cost/3yrs Earns 9% 15% 2% 
Source: van Tranh, 2008  
 
Most Vietnamese migrants have three-year contracts, and their expected earnings as well as the 
cost of migrating vary significantly by destination. Migrants to Malaysia earn the least, $10,800 
over three years, while migrants to South Korea earn the most, $30,600 over three years. The 
costs of migrating abroad are lowest for those going to South Korea, $700 or two percent of 
expected earnings, but Korean employers expect migrants to work up to 10 hours a day, and 
abuse of migrants is reported to be common.  Malaysia accepts twice as many Vietnamese 
migrants as Korea, but at wages that are only a third of Korean levels, so that migrants in 
Malaysia have far lower savings and remittances. 
The Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (www.molisa.gov.vn) has a 
Bureau for Overseas Labor Management to regulate labor supply companies, which since 1991 
have been licensed to send migrants abroad. Decree 141/2005/ND-CP, issued November 11, 
2005, regulates recruitment and foreign employment, establishes penalties of 20,000 to 20 million 
dong ($1,300) for collecting excessive recruitment fees, being illegally abroad, and ―running 
away‖ or abandoning a foreign work contract. It is very hard to regulate the brokers who work on 
commission for licensed recruiters in rural villages, as they go from house to house and making 
oral promises about earnings and work abroad. 
There are many stories of migrants being tricked by recruiters. A typical news account explains 
that e.g. a young person in a rural area paid $2,000 for a contract to work in Malaysia but received 
a tourist visa that did not permit work. When apprehended in Malaysia working illegally, 
migrants are fined and returned, the recruiters have disappeared. The fact that many migrants do 
not demand written contracts, and many believe oral promises, means that abuses are likely to 
continue until education of migrants and regulation of agents is improved 
(http://ipsnews.net/migration/stories/exports.html).  
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Vietnam had a five percent tax on remittances until 1997; when this tax was removed, formal 
remittances rose (GEP, 2006, 93). Like many other countries that send workers abroad, Vietnam 
allows returning migrants to import some goods duty free when they return from jobs abroad. 
Vietnam in 2006 taxed those earning more than five million dong ($315) a month, but was 
considering lowering the income threshold to raise more taxes from lower earners, including 
migrants. 
South Asian Migrant-Sending Countries 
Labor migration from South Asia mostly involves workers going abroad on two-year contracts to 
the Gulf oil exporters, high variance in the share of women leaving to be domestic helpers, and 
heavy reliance on private recruiters in both sending and receiving countries.  These labor 
migration patterns raise issues that range from irregular migration to the vulnerability of female 
domestic helpers. 
The five major South Asia labor-sending countries sent over 1.5 million migrant workers abroad 
legally in 2005, led by India, which sent 549,000 migrants; Bangladesh, 253,000; Sri Lanka, 
231,000; Nepal, 184,000; and Pakistan, 142,000.
62
  There were 24 million South Asians abroad 
in 2000, including nine million Indians (four million in the Gulf countries), almost seven million 
Bangladeshis (most in India, but three million in the Gulf countries), and 3.5 million Pakistanis 
abroad, including 1.5 million in other South Asian countries and almost a million in the Gulf 
countries. South Asian countries received US$40 billion in remittances in 2007, led by US$27 
billion in India; US$6.6 billion in Bangladesh; US$6 billion in Pakistan; US$2.5 billion in Sri 
Lanka; and US$1.7 billion in Nepal.
63
  
South Asian countries are developing specialized agencies to promote and protect migrant 
workers.  Sri Lanka in 2007 created a Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare 
(www.minfep.gov.lk), and both Bangladesh and Pakistan have similar specialized agencies to 
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 Remittance data are from the World Bank’s November 2008 release 
(www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances, accessed December 7, 2008) 
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"market" their country's workers to foreign employers, process the contracts that allow them to 
go abroad legally, and regulate the recruiters who place most migrants in foreign jobs. 
Bangladesh 
Remittances are Bangladesh's second leading source of foreign exchange, after garments.
64
 The 
number of migrants leaving Bangladesh averaged 250,000 a year between 2001 and 2006, rose to 
almost 400,000 in 2006, and doubled to 832,600 in 2007 (Malek, 2008); the government expects 
to send 900,000 workers abroad in 2008. 
According to government data, 60 percent of Bangladeshi migrants leave on their own, 39 
percent leave with the help of recruiters, and one percent leave via government and other 
channels.  However, most of the 60 percent who leave "on their own" in fact leave with the help 
of recruiters who coach migrants to say they are leaving on their own, so that the government 
does not check the migrant’s contract. 
Bangladeshi migrants abroad often encounter problems. Many discover they do not have jobs 
once abroad despite contracts, while others are pressured to sign new contracts once abroad that 
offer lower wages than were stipulated in the contracts they signed before departure. Most 
Bangladeshi recruiting agents say that they are victims of foreign families and recruiters who sell 
them false sponsorships for jobs in Gulf oil exporting countries and keep the fees paid by 
employers, requiring them to charge migrants for passports, visas and travel. Bangladeshi 
recruiters locate workers to fill the (fictitious) jobs, charging each migrant for passports, visas, 
health checks and transportation, but the migrants can wind up in the Gulf in debt and in an 
irregular status.
65
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 Garments generate the most foreign exchange, about $8 billion a year, half of which are knitwear or ready-made 
garments.  However, Bangladesh imports over $5 billion worth of fabric, buttons and other inputs to produce 
garments, making the value added about 35 percent.  Some 2.5 million mostly young women cut fabric, operate 
sewing machines, and sort garments six days and 48 hours a week for a base wage of 1,662 taka ($24) a month, plus 
about $10 a month in overtime pay.  Most of the young women are from villages, and most work in garment 
factories less than four years 
65
 There are also problems with the recruitment of Bangladeshis in Malaysia, which does not have a sponsorship 
system, suggesting that at least some of the recruitment problems are in Bangladesh. Some 15,000 Bangladeshis 
arrived in Kuala Lumpur with seemingly valid work contracts, and were stranded at the airport when no one met 
them. If Malaysian employers do not send someone to meet arriving migrants, the migrants are returned to their 
country of origin. Migrant advocates blamed the Malaysian government for allowing 20 recruiters to bring 300,000 
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The cost of migrating from Bangladesh to the Gulf is about $1,200, half of which covers airfare 
and half covers passport and visa costs, health checks and required criminal check certificates.  
Most Bangladeshi male migrants pay $2,000 for foreign jobs that offer $200 a month or less, 
meaning that recruitment costs are equivalent to almost a year's salary on a typical two- or three-
year contract.  Bangladeshi women going to Gulf countries to be domestic helpers pay less, 
about $850, and earn less, about $150 a month, in part because some Gulf households prefer 
Muslim helpers.
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Seen another way, each 100,000 Bangladeshi migrants deployed generates about $80 million in 
recruitment "profits," so that reaching the government's goal of sending a million migrants a year 
abroad could generate $800 million in recruitment revenues above the actual costs of sending 
workers abroad. Most Bangladeshi recruiters are private, and most recruitment payments are 
made by migrants in villages to sub-agents who are not licensed or registered and who do not 
issue receipts.  Some Dhaka-based recruiters say they know nothing about the activities of 
subagents, who are usually residents of the village in which they recruit migrants and collect 
payments from them. A common recommendation to protect migrants is to require that receipts 
be issued for all payments made for labor migration. 
Half of the Bangladeshis abroad in 2007 were classified as unskilled, a third as skilled, and 15 
percent as semi-skilled; less than four percent were professionals.  Bangladesh discourages 
women from working abroad, and lifted a ban on women going abroad to be domestic helpers in 
2003.  There are a number of government and private agencies that aim to provide skills training 
for Bangladeshis interested in foreign jobs, but the credentials they issue are often not recognized 
abroad. 
India 
India’s Emigration Act of 1983 on Overseas Recruitment established "protectors of emigrants" 
(POE) offices and required Indians leaving for foreign jobs to obtain certificates from POEs 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bangladeshi migrants into the country in 2008, and the Bangladeshi government for not policing recruiters in that 
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before departure.  However, 13 categories of persons, including those with 10 or more years of 
schooling, are exempt from this POE emigration-certificate requirement. India issues two types 
of passports— those for which an emigration check is required before departure and those that 
do not require an emigration check. Reformers would like to eliminate emigration-check-
required passports, saying that POE checks add costs but few protections for migrants. 
The 1983 Act also required recruiters to register and created three categories of recruiters based 
on the number of migrants sent abroad. There were 1,835 registered Indian recruitment agencies 
in 2007, and they pay service fees to the POEs that reflect the skill of the workers they send 
abroad.
67
  The POE regulatory system sometimes leads to corruption and exploitation, as some 
POE offices work closely with favored recruiters and do not carefully check migrant worker 
contracts. 
About two-thirds of Indian migrant workers leave from South India (20 percent each from Kerala 
and Tamil Nedu). Some 1.8 million Kerala residents are abroad, and remittances of $5 billion a 
year are equivalent to 20 percent of Kerala state's GDP.
68
  About a quarter of remittances to 
Kerala are spent on education, and educating residents who cannot find jobs locally reportedly 
spurs emigration, as unemployment in Kerala is almost 20 percent. Kerala is a state of 32 million 
with a per capita income of $675, below the $730 average for India. 
A survey of Indian migrants found that 80 percent learned of foreign jobs from friends and 
relatives, they paid an average $1,200 to migrate, and a third turned to money lenders to cover 
these pre-departure costs.  Migrants using recruitment agents paid more, an average $2,000, to 
cover the cost of the foreign work visa, passport, medical tests, insurance and the airfare to the 
job.  About 60 percent of the jobs held by the Indians in the Gulf paid $200 a month, making 
recruitment costs equivalent to six to 10 months' earnings. 
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Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka is the smallest and richest of the major South Asian labor exporters, with 20 million 
residents, a labor force of about 7.6 million, and an estimated 1.6 million citizens abroad, mostly 
in the Gulf oil-exporting states.  Like the other South Asian countries sending workers abroad, 
male Sri Lankan construction workers were deployed to Gulf oil-exporting countries to fill 
construction jobs in the mid-1970s.  The number of Sri Lankan migrants and the share of women 
rose rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s, as the Sri Lankan government promoted out-migration 
as a way to provide jobs in an economy distorted by a civil war.   
Outmigration peaked at 231,000 in 2005, when almost 60 percent of the Sri Lankan migrants 
were women, most from rural areas and most finding their first wage-paying job in a foreign 
household.  About 80 percent of Sri Lankan migrants go to four countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
UAE, and Qatar.   
Like other South Asian countries, the Sri Lankan government wants to send more skilled 
workers and fewer domestic helpers abroad, which translates into more men and fewer women.  
Kingsley Ranawaka, chairman of Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, said "We want to 
reduce the number of women migrant workers mainly because of complaints we received from 
those in Middle East countries."  The SLBFE reported 3,400 complaints from female migrants in 
the first half of 2008, most involving harassment, breach of contract and unpaid or underpaid 
salaries. 
To help change the composition of its migrants, the Sri Lankan government created a Ministry of 
Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare in 2007 and charged it with "promoting" foreign 
employment by undertaking marketing missions, upgrading the training of Sri Lankan workers 
seeking foreign jobs, and protecting migrants and their families. Sri Lanka has signed MOUs 
governing labor migration with Bahrain, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait and the UAE, and is negotiating 
MOUs with Japan, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
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The creation of the MFEPW highlights the growing role of migration and remittances to the Sri 
Lankan economy.  Remittances topped $2.5 billion in 2007, making them almost 10 percent of 
Sri Lankan's $27 billion GDP.  Out-migration and remittances are generally welcomed, but some 
economists warn that the influx of remittances made the Sri Lankan rupee overvalued, closing 
garment factories and encouraging the women who were laid off to seek jobs abroad as domestic 
helpers. 
Human Development Impacts of Migration 
This section assesses the impacts of migration on human development in major migrant-sending 
and migrant-receiving countries in the Asian-Pacific region, including impacts on socio-
economic indicators as well as political participation and human rights. The major points 
include: 
 Migration theories have evolved from envisioning individuals comparing wages in two 
areas to comparing expected wages and including family or household factors in making 
decisions about whether to move. Potential migrants consider factors that range from the 
risk of no income at home and abroad to seeing work abroad as insurance in the event of 
crop failure and offering the fastest way to earn money to repay high-interest loans 
incurred for health and other emergencies. 
 There is a relative shortage of high-skilled migrants and a relative surplus of low-skilled 
migrants available to fill foreign jobs.  As a result, migrant rights in destination areas 
usually increase with an individual’s level of education and skill. 
 The human development impacts of migration that increase choices and opportunities for 
individuals are perhaps most noticeable among women, who may gain power in 
traditional households because of their foreign earnings or assume more decision-making 
responsibilities in households in which males are abroad. One universal tendency is for 
female migrants to direct more remittances to health care and education for their children.  
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Voluntary migration allows individuals and families to choose higher wage jobs in areas offering 
more opportunity, fulfilling a central tenet of Sen’s (1999) concept of development as freedom.69 
The fundamental reason for international labor migration is that the global distribution of 
workers does not match the distribution of economic wealth at a time when communications and 
transportation revolutions establish bridges that enable more people to cross national borders.  
Voluntary migration generally results in economic betterment for migrants and the areas to 
which they move, but it is less clear whether the areas left behind benefit from sending some of 
their best and brightest residents abroad.  
Most economists define development as an increase in real per capita income. Sen argues that 
development should increase the capability of human beings to achieve those things they value 
most.  Higher incomes increase capabilities, and thus may be necessary for development, but 
higher incomes alone do not guarantee individuals the ability to influence political decisions that 
affect them, ensure good health, or provide adequate education systems. Development is both an 
economic and a political process, and Sen emphasizes the importance of good health care and 
education because, without them, people cannot develop their capabilities.
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Sen’s approach recognizes that there may be tradeoffs between capabilities.  As the UNDP’s 
2000 Human Development Report emphasized, ―scarcity of resources…often require us to 
prioritize concern for securing differing rights for the purposes of policy choice. Human 
development analysis helps us to see these choices in explicit and direct terms.‖ (2000, 23). As 
outlined below, one of the trade offs in migration for individuals is whether to move to earn 
higher wages and a second-class status abroad or remain at home where wages are lower but the 
individual has full rights. 
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 Sen argues that freedom is a core component of development, and a key to accelerating development.   
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 Sen reviewed three philosophies for social justice, finding that each has merit but, if pushed to extremes, defies 
common sense. Utilitarianism aims for the greatest good for the greatest number in a community, but would tolerate 
persecuting a member of the community if persecution maximized community utility. Libertarianism aims to 
maximize individual rights, limiting them only to protect the community and raising questions about regulating 
health care and medicine or allowing markets to sort out winners and losers. The maximin principle aims to 
maximize the well-being of the poorest, which could lead to so much redistribution that the better off would reduce 
their work effort. 
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Theories of Migration 
The modern economics of migration begin with Lewis (1954), who examined urban economic 
development with unlimited supplies of rural labor.  Lewis explained how surplus rural workers 
could migrate and be absorbed in an expanding modern sector. Ranis and Fei (1961) formalized 
the Lewis model, so that two-sector models in which the active ingredient was the demand for 
labor in the destination area dominated the migration literature for decades.   
The Lewis dual economy includes a capitalist urban sector and a noncapitalist rural sector. The 
capitalist sector hires labor and sells output for a profit, while the noncapitalist or subsistence 
sector does not use reproducible capital and does not hire labor for a profit. Labor is concentrated 
in the noncapitalist sector and, as the capitalist sector expands, there is rural-urban migration. 
Lewis assumed that rural labor is available to the urban economy in unlimited quantities at a 
fixed real wage, which may be zero, so that rural-urban migration does not reduce farm output 
but does raise urban output. 
The Ranis and Fei model is based on the assumption that the supply of surplus rural labor will 
shrink with migration, and that the marginal value product of labor in the rural and urban sectors 
will soon equilibrate. Most computable general equilibrium models of international migration are 
based on the assumption that migration from lower-to-higher wage areas leads to a convergence 
in MVPs and wages that reduces incentives to migrate. 
The fact that rural wages often remain lower than urban wages despite significant rural-urban 
migration prompted Todaro (1969) to highlight imperfections in urban labor markets as a reason 
for continued migration. Instead of comparing wages in two areas, migrants in Todaro models 
compare expected wages, and move if the expected higher urban wage exceeds the rural wage—
urban areas are assumed to have both higher wages and higher unemployment rates. Todaro was 
able to explain why rural-urban migration continued high urban unemployment. 
The Todaro model is frequently used in empirical research despite well-known shortcomings, 
including the assumptions that high-wage jobs are allocated by lottery rather than networks. It 
also ignores the informal sector in high-wage areas that serves as a sponge for migrants seeking 
high-wage formal jobs and neglects influences other than expected wages in migrant decisions.  
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The new economics of labor migration shifts the focus from the individual to the household or 
family, and expands the goals of this larger unit from maximizing earnings to include 
minimizing risks and compensating for missing markets for capital and insurance (Stark and 
Bloom, 1985). The new economics of labor migration emphasizes that migrants retain links to 
the households in which they used to live, and that the risks and uncertainties in origin and 
destination areas can prompt migration, remittances, and insurance.  For example, in order to 
migrate abroad, an individual may need funds to pay recruitment or smuggling costs, which may 
require the family to sell or mortgage land.  Once in a higher-wage area, the migrant may remit 
funds to help the family repay the debts incurred to migrate, to help the family educate children 
or receive health care, and to ensure that, in the event of injury or layoff, the family will 
welcome him/her home.   
The new economics of labor migration introduced a number of motivations for migration other 
than higher wages. One line of research emphasizes the riskiness of incomes in farming areas, 
showing that sending an older son or daughter to an urban labor market at home or abroad can 
minimize the risk of no farm income in the event of crop failure (Stark and Levhari, 1982). 
Another line of research emphasized that, if some people in a community migrate and are able to 
obtain more consumer goods, a sense of relative deprivation may encourage others to migrate so 
that they can buy the goods available with remittances (Stark and Taylor, 1989).   
Finally, migration may help farmers to overcome market failures, as when they want to expand 
operations but cannot find a low-cost source of capital because of a lack the records banks need 
to assess risks. In such circumstances, migration may be the quickest way to obtain the capital 
needed for expansion. This same lack of capital may prevent the poorest households from 
sending migrants to higher wage areas, and is one reason why there may be a migration hump, or 
initially more migration from rural areas as they become richer (Martin, 1993).  The increased 
availability of household data in migrant-sending areas has generated a dramatic increase in the 
number of empirical studies that attempt to measure expected wage and other factors that 
influence individual and household migration decisions. 
56 
 
Migrant Numbers and Rights 
A major challenge in the Asia-Pacific region is how to weigh the tradeoff between migrant 
numbers and migrant rights, especially for governments seeking to send more workers abroad. 
There is often an asymmetry in the rights extended to high- and low-skilled migrant workers that 
reflects supply and demand parameters. There are relatively few highly skilled workers, which 
means that employers seeking them generally persuade host governments to admit them with 
families and often a path to settlement.  There are far more low-skilled migrant workers, which 
means that employers sometimes offer them lower wages than they pay to local workers, and 
many host governments restrict their rights to settle. 
The international migrant rights regime does not make distinctions between high- and low-
skilled migrant workers. However, the bedrock principle of migrant rights conventions, equality 
of treatment, may lead a tradeoff between migrant rights and migrant numbers, especially in low-
skill labor markets.  Given a negatively sloped demand for labor, equal rights for migrants that 
raise labor costs mean more rights that increase labor costs can decrease the demand for migrant 
workers. Debates during the WTO’s GATS negotiations over whether migrant service providers 
must be paid minimum or equal wages in the countries in which they work highlights this 
numbers and rights dilemma. 
The demand for labor is negatively sloped, meaning that more workers are hired at lower wages. 
More rights for workers generally increase labor costs, whether rights reflect minimum wages, 
work-related benefits, or workplace issues such as safe work equipment. As a result, there can be 
a tradeoff between the number of workers hired and their rights.  This trade off is familiar in 
minimum wage debates—there is often opposition to higher minimum wages from those who 
assert that the result will be fewer jobs. If there is an excess supply of low-skilled migrants eager 
to work in high-wage countries, extending more rights to them may raise their cost and result in 
fewer admissions.  
In the figure below, countries on the X-axis are arranged from those that offer fewer to those that 
offer more rights to temporary foreign workers; the share of migrants in their labor force is on 
the Y-axis. The line connecting numbers and rights for low-skill migrants is shown as negatively 
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sloped, reflecting the fact that the countries with the highest shares of temporary foreign workers 
in their labor forces offer among the fewest rights. By contrast, the line connecting numbers and 
rights for professionals is positively sloped to suggest that countries wanting  more health-care 
and IT professionals must usually offer them more rights, such as the right to move with their 
families and settle.   
Figure 1 Migrant Numbers and Rights 
 
 
 
The reason for negatively and positively sloped lines connecting migrant numbers and rights 
reflects supply and demand. For both high- and low-skilled migrants, the demand for labor is 
negatively sloped, meaning that more workers are hired at lower wages. Many labor rights have 
costs, as with minimum or equal wage laws, employer payments for work-related benefits, and 
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the provision of safe work equipment. As a result, there can be a tradeoff between the number of 
workers hired and their right to equal wages, benefits, and safety. 
Many government policies at least implicitly acknowledge that they must offer more rights to 
attract highly skilled migrants, as is evident in the ―success‖ of the US H-1B program and the 
―failure‖ of the German green-card program to attract foreign IT workers.71 Among low-skill 
migrants, the extremes may lie in comparisons of Scandinavian countries, which have very few 
guest workers, and the Gulf countries, where over 90 percent of private sector workers are 
migrants. 
Instead of 1960s-style rotation of guest workers, 21
st
 century discussion of how to move low-
skilled migrants in and out of host countries emphasizes circular and life-cycle approaches to 
migration. Circular migration schemes usually give sending-country governments some role in 
selecting migrants, guarantee migrants who return at the end of seasonal contracts the right to go 
abroad again next year, and sometimes link labor migration opportunities with sending-country 
cooperation to accept the return of apprehended foreigners and to discourage illegal 
outmigration.   
Circular migration programs have been embraced by those who want to increase movements of 
low-skilled workers from poorer to richer countries.  They have proposed that migrants post 
bonds before departure that are forfeited if they do not return, involve sending-country 
governments in repatriation, and blacklist individuals, families and villages from opportunities to 
work abroad if someone does not return as required. Similarly, life-cycle approaches to 
migration emphasize including sending-country governments in efforts to persuade migrants to 
return and to re-integrate into their countries of origin. 
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 The US H-1B program admits foreigners with renewable three-year visas who can be sponsored by their 
employers for immigrant visas during the six years they can remain in H-1B status. The attestation admissions 
process is easy, although the certification procedure to obtain an immigrant visa is more difficult.  Employers 
request more than twice the 85,000 H-1B visas that are available each year; most are Indians employed in IT. 
The German green-card program between 2000 and 2003 allowed up to 20,000 non-EU foreigners to be employed 
in Germany for three to five years. Fewer than 20,000 were issued, in part because there was no straight path to 
permanent residence status. Higher earnings requirements and language may also have played roles in reducing the 
inflow of foreigners into Germany. 
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Migrant Rights and Empowerment 
Migration usually increases choices and opportunities for people who move.  Migrants moving 
from lower to higher wage areas usually have higher incomes and more spending power, which 
they can exercise in the destination or upon their return to their areas of origin.  The migration 
experience can also have other effects, positive and negative, on origin and destination areas.  
For example, migrants can spark entrepreneurship in destination areas, as they spot opportunities 
for new businesses, or help to bring about political and cultural change in sending areas, as when 
returned migrants press for more transparent government and women assume enhanced 
economic and political roles. 
Most migration in the Asia-Pacific region is temporary or contract labor migration, not 
settlement migration (the major exceptions are immigration to Australia and New Zealand and 
the immigration of professionals to Singapore). This means that the effects of migration on 
human development are more likely to be found in countries of origin rather than in countries of 
destination, since most migrants are expected to return.  Unlike the focus on integration 
indicators such as unemployment, earnings, and the political participation of immigrants and 
their descendants in North America and Europe, migrant human development indicators in the 
Asia-Pacific region center on migrants who use remittances to achieve upward mobility.
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Multilateral Agreements 
There are two noteworthy efforts to develop multilateral agreements to protect the rights of 
migrant workers and enhance their development impacts in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaders of 
the 10 ASEAN countries signed a Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers January 13, 2007 in Cebu, Philippines that commits migrant-sending and -
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For example, there are no indexes similar to the Migrant Integration Policy Index that was developed for 28 
European countries to assess opportunities for the 20 million non-EU nationals living legally in the 27-member EU 
(plus Canada). MIPEX assesses integration in areas ranging from family unification to political participation 
(www.integrationindex.eu).  Some 140 country policies were ranked from 0 to 100, with 100 considered ―best 
practice.‖ 
Labor market access was considered best practice if non-EU foreigners had their credentials recognized in the 
recipient country quickly, were eligible for training and unemployment benefits if laid off, and can join unions and 
change jobs. Sweden and southern European countries ranked highest on the MIPEX labor market access indicator, 
scoring 85 or more, France, Germany, and Ireland were in the middle, scoring 50, and Poland was near the bottom, 
scoring 25. 
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receiving states to cooperate to ―resolve the cases of migrant workers who, through no fault of 
their own, have subsequently become undocumented…[but] Nothing in the present Declaration 
shall be interpreted as implying the regularization of the situation of migrant workers who are 
undocumented.‖ (www.aseansec.org/19264.htm).   
The ASEAN Declaration calls on migrant-receiving states to protect the ―fundamental human 
rights‖ of migrant workers and to ―promote fair and appropriate employment protection, 
payment of wages, and adequate access to decent working and living conditions for migrant 
workers.‖  Migrant-sending states are asked to ―enhance measures related to the promotion and 
protection of the rights of migrant workers‖ and ―establish and promote legal practices to 
regulate recruitment of migrant workers.‖ The ASEAN Declaration is not legally binding on 
ASEAN member states and does not require governments to change their labor laws. Instead, an 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural blueprint is to establish strategic action plans to be achieved by 2015, 
including progress on migrant rights. 
The Colombo process (www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/pid/820) began as an effort in 
2003 by countries sending migrant workers to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to improve 
protections for their citizens, to share data, and to increase the benefits of labor migration to 
countries of origin.  Several destination countries joined in 2005, and in January 2008, 20 
migrant-sending countries joined the GCC migrant-receiving countries and South Korea in 
endorsing the Abu Dhabi Dialogue on Temporary Contractual Labor, which laid out a life-cycle 
approach to managing circular labor migration. With the support of the UAE, pilot projects in 
2009 between the UAE and India and the Philippines aim to improve four key aspects of contract 
labor migration, viz, recruitment, employment abroad, preparation for return, and reintegration 
(www.iom.ch/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/1674?entryId=20224).   
About three million ―contract workers‖ arrive in the Gulf Cooperation Council each year. The 
pilot projects aim to improve conditions for migrants employed in UAE construction, hospitality, 
and health care jobs in the four stages of the ―migration life cycle.‖ Migrants, who are to be 
protected from ―excessive recruiting fees,‖  are to receive enforceable contracts in a language 
they understand at one-stop shops that also provide orientation before departure.  
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Once in the UAE, migrants are to have access to a hotline in their language to obtain information 
and register complaints.  UAE governments are to develop effective systems to monitor wages 
and working conditions and resolve employer-migrant disputes, including those that require the 
migrant to change employers. 
UAE government agencies are to identify workers whose contracts are expiring, run publicity 
campaigns to encourage workers to return and not become unauthorized, and cooperate with 
sending-country governments to advise migrants what they can expect upon return. Sending-
country governments pledged to cooperate to encourage returns and offer counseling and 
opportunities to invest in migrant areas of origin.  
The United Arab Emirates is a group of seven semiautonomous states with a population of 4.4 
million, including 80 percent foreigners.  These migrants fill virtually all private sector jobs, are 
building modern cities expected to include the world's tallest skyscrapers.
73
  Some $2 trillion in 
construction projects were underway in 2008. 
There were 3.1 million migrant workers employed by 260,000 firms in the UAE in April 2008; 
most were construction workers.  Some 30,000 migrant workers employed by Arabtec Holding, 
the largest construction firm in Dubai, went on strike in November  2007, and returned to work 
after a 20 percent wage increase. Worker protests continued in 2008 because of low and 
nonpayment of wages, especially as the value of the migrants’ dollar-denominated wages 
declined with the US dollar (the UAE dirhan is linked to the US dollar).  Most migrants earn 
$200 to $250 a month, and found they could save less than anticipated because of rising prices in 
the UAE.  Meanwhile, their remittances bought less in India and other sending countries as the 
value of migrant-sending country currencies rose. 
The life-cycle pilot projects arose in response to the UAE’s heavy dependence on migrants and 
the worker protests. The life-cycle policy involves sending-country governments more closely in 
managing migrants, and has been linked to other UAE policies, including a June 2008 pledge by 
Abu Dhabi to build dormitories and apartments for up to 800,000 "limited-income workers," 
including laborers, cleaners, technicians and housekeepers.  The announcement continued: "All 
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 Two Burj (tower) projects were underway in 2008, one expected to top 2,300 feet and another 3,281 feet (one 
kilometer).  Currently, the tallest building in the world is Taipei 101 in Taiwan, which is 1,671 feet high. 
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utilities will be provided, there will be air conditioning and everything needed for decent living 
conditions will be available."  Since 2006, UAE employers may not require migrants to work 
between 12:30 and 3 pm during July and August. However, the UAE does not have a minimum 
wage for migrant workers. 
Women and Children 
A high share of migrants leaving Asian countries are women. The opportunity to earn money 
abroad, often far more than men who remain earn at home, has empowered some migrant women 
by allowing them to escape paternalistic family structures or domestic violence (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild, 2003; Gamburd, 2000). Rural women going abroad to work, often earning their first 
wages, usually report more  control over family spending. One result of female financial 
empowerment is that the share of family spending on health care and education tends to rise, 
although both men and women often make improved housing a first priority in spending migrant 
remittances.
74
   
The fact that remittances, especially from women abroad, increase spending on the health care 
and education of children suggests that the human development impacts of migration must be 
sought in the long term rather than the short term. Theodore Schultz (1963) argued that the best 
way to help the rural poor was to educate their children so that they could achieve more than 
their parents.
75
  
Evaluating the effects of migration on human development in Asia may require examining the 
mobility of the children of migrants. We found no longitudinal studies comparing the children of 
migrants and non-migrants in major migrant-sending countries such as the Philippines, and none 
that compared the effects on children of having male and female migrants abroad. 
The human development effects of migration on the children of migrants are mixed. Many Asian 
women care for children or the elderly abroad while leaving their own children in the care of 
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 VanWey (2004) finds that women remitting to their families in rural Thailand tend to have more altruistic motives 
for migration, while men often remit to fulfill the terms of explicit or implicit contracts.  
75
 Schultz won the Nobel prize in economics in 1979.  He was greatly influenced by the rapid recovery of Germany 
and Japan after WWII, emphasizing that education makes people productive and good health makes the education 
investment viable. 
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husbands or relatives at home.  The result is a trade off for the children of migrants.  Migrant 
families have more resources to invest in children, but the children in migrant households lack 
the benefits of having their mothers readily available during critical development years. The 
impact of migration to provide care to others rather than care for children at home is hotly 
debated among those examining global care chains (Yates, 2005).
76
 
Political Participation 
Most Asia-Pacific governments sending workers abroad have agencies charged with protecting 
migrants during recruitment and responding to those in need abroad. The effectiveness of these 
agencies is often a subject of dispute between local NGOs and governments, with NGOs often 
critical of government migrant-protection efforts, especially in migrant-sending countries such as 
Bangladesh and Indonesia. Piper (2007) argues that NGOs must pressure government agencies to 
fulfill their mandates. 
In some migrant-receiving countries in the Asia-Pacific, migrants have formed organizations to 
protect their interests, notably Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong. However, in most Asia-
Pacific countries, there are restrictions on the ability of foreign migrants to form advocacy 
organizations, so that NGOs led by citizens often take the lead in protecting migrants. These 
organizations are sometimes pressured by host-country governments. 
An oft-cited example involves Irene Fernandez, director of the Malaysian migrant rights 
organization Tenaganita (www.tenaganita.net). Fernandez published a memo in 1995 on Abuse, 
Torture and Dehumanized Conditions of Migrant Workers in Detention Centers, charging that 
the Malaysian government did not protect unauthorized migrants while they were being detained 
before removal. The Malaysian government alleged that the memo included falsehoods, and a 
court sentenced her to a year in prison in 2003. Fernandez appealed, and had the sentence 
vacated in 2008 after serious problems with the government’s case, including lost evidence. 
Malaysia has a People's Volunteer Corps (RELA) of 500,000 to help enforce laws, including 
laws against unauthorized foreigners.  RELA volunteers, supervised by the Interior Ministry, 
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 The book edited by Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) includes essays on the ―the female underside of 
globalization," emphasizing the growing role of foreign women in service jobs in richer countries.  
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wear green uniforms and yellow berets as they enter workplaces and homes without warrants and 
make arrests (after receiving permission from RELA leaders).  Some carry firearms to ensure 
that the migrants they arrest accompany them to local police stations, where their work permits 
are checked. The wife of the Indonesian ambassador was arrested by RELA volunteers in 2007, 
which led to an official protest. Migrant activists say that RELA volunteers have become 
vigilantes, sometimes planting evidence to justify arrests of foreigners and often using excessive 
force.
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Piper and Yamanaka (2007) put Malaysia and Singapore in the category of migrant-receiving 
countries that ―severely curtail pro-migrant actions.‖ By contrast, Japan and Korea allow NGOs 
to aid migrants, including unauthorized migrants, despite public opinion that is often hostile to 
especially low-skilled foreigners. The most liberal migrant-receiving area is Hong Kong, where 
the ―British colonial legacy‖ allows migrants ―to openly pursue economic rights and collective 
actions.‖ 
It should be noted that many residents of migrant-receiving countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
do not favor equal rights for migrants and want their governments to do more to reduce illegal 
migration. For example, there were competing demonstrations in Seoul Korea in November 
2008, as migrants and their allies denounced the raids mounted by the government to locate 
unauthorized foreigners while several Korean civic groups called for more government action 
against unauthorized foreigners. 
There is less evidence of activism involving returned migrants. We found no political parties or 
other collective entities representing returned migrants that press for fundamental changes in 
government migration, economic, or other policies in the major migrant-sending countries. For 
example, Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong are among the best organized migrants abroad, 
and the organizations representing them have been very active in demanding changes in laws and 
regulations in both Hong Kong and the Philippines that affect women while they are migrant 
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For more information on RELA, see the 2007 articles on Southeast Asia in Migration News 
(http://migration.ucdavis.edu/) 
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workers.
78
 However, once Filipina women return, most lose contact with the NGOs that advocate 
on behalf of migrants. 
Migrants settled abroad sometimes continue to participate in political affairs at home, which can 
speed or slow development and political change.  One of the examples of a Diaspora accelerating 
political change at home involved the support of Filipino migrants for the removal of Ferdinand 
Marcos. Corazon Aquino, who replaced Marcos in 1986 as president, traveled to San Francisco 
soon after her inauguration and thanked Filipino-Americans for their contributions to the struggle 
for democracy.  The Philippines has established a fairly complex system of incentives for its 
Diaspora to remain engaged in the Philippine economy and society, but does not have systems in 
place to evaluate their effectiveness. 
Pacific Islands, GCC, Economic Contributions 
This section explores recent developments in the Asia-Pacific region, including the recruitment 
of Pacific Islanders to fill seasonal jobs in Australia and New Zealand in a bid to speed 
development in migrant-sending islands, discussion of ending the sponsorship system in GCC 
countries, and efforts to estimate the economic contributions of migrants in countries where their 
presence is contentious, including in Thailand.  The major points made in this section include: 
 New Zealand and Australia are launching unique programs that include labor, migration, 
and development agencies and aim to fill seasonal farm jobs and promote development in 
the migrants’ countries of origin 
 GCC countries are re-examining the kafala sponsorship system that makes a local citizen 
responsible for each foreigner in the country but also leads to migrant abuse as 
sponsorships are sold to vulnerable migrants who go in debt to secure work contracts 
 Migrants add mouths to feed and hands to work in destination countries.  Their economic 
impacts in receiving countries are much debated. In industrial countries such as the US, it 
has been very hard to measure any wage depression or unemployment due to the presence 
                                                 
78The third Filipino migrant workers’ summit (www.migrants.net), held in Hong Kong in August 2008, concluded 
with demands on the Hong Kong government (raise the minimum wage and expanded labor protections), demands 
on the Philippine government (end fees to verify employment contracts and the Documentary Stamp Tax on 
remittances), and on the international community (stop the GFMD because it ―commodifies labor.‖) United 
Filipinos in Hong Kong (www.unifil.org.hk) also advocates on behalf of Filipino migrants. 
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of low-skill migrants amid an ongoing debate about the best procedure to make such 
estimates. Middle-income developing countries such as Thailand are adopting similar 
methodologies, posing a danger that the results can be driven by the assumptions about 
whether migrant and local workers are substitutes or complements and how investment 
responds to the additional workers. 
Pacific Island Guest Workers 
New Zealand and Australia have launched guest worker programs with Pacific Island countries 
to fill seasonal farm jobs and to jump-start development in rural areas of small island economies.  
Under NZ’s Recognized Seasonal Employers (RSE) scheme and Australia’s Pacific Seasonal 
Workers Pilot (PSWP) scheme, poor residents of island nations are to be selected by employers 
or local governments to work seasonally in farm jobs, and government ministries devoted to 
development assistance are involved with labor and migration ministries in program 
administration. The programs are too new to evaluate their development impacts, but are 
significant for aiming to achieve the win-win-win outcomes sought by the GFMD.  
The New Zealand government on April 30, 2007 launched the Recognized Seasonal Employers 
(RSE) scheme to admit workers from Pacific Islands
79
 to fill seasonal farm jobs.  The RSE began 
with workers from five islands, and was extended to include the Solomon Islands in 2008; up to 
8,000 foreign workers can be admitted under the RSE in the year ending March 31, 2009 
(www.immigration.govt.nz/community/stream/employ/rse/).
80
  
The purpose of the RSE is to fill seasonal jobs in New Zealand and to promote development in 
the Pacific Islands, generating the win-win-win outcomes for migrants, sending- and host-nations 
fostered by the Global Forum on Migration and Development (www.gfmd2008.org).
81
  The 
World Bank has been a major proponent of temporary worker programs to speed economic 
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 The Pacific Islands have small populations, high fertility, and few natural resources. Women average 3.7 children 
in Tonga, and over a third of residents are under 15. 
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Originally six islands were included--Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu in Polynesia, Kiribati in Micronesia, and Fiji and 
Vanuatu in Melanesia.  As part of the sanctions against Fiji after a military coup in December 2006, Fiji was 
dropped from the list. 
81
 NZ’s immigrant selection system uses points to assess those wanting to migrate for employment; low-skilled 
workers willing to fill seasonal jobs tend to be excluded. 
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development in Pacific Islands, and the RSE is aimed at providing the remittances and returns 
needed to employ the rapidly growing work forces of the islands (Luthria et al 2006). 
The New Zealand horticultural industry exports almost half of its NZ$5 billion in annual output 
with the help of a peak 40,000 seasonal workers in March-April; 60 percent are hired in the 
Hawke’s Bay and Bay of Plenty region (www.hortnz.co.nz/activityareas/seasonalwork.html).  
Employers who have been relying on the un- and underemployed, students, and Working 
Holidaymakers have been complaining of labor shortages as the horticultural industry expanded 
amidst a boom that reduced the supply of workers available to fill seasonal jobs. Employers 
complained of high turnover among too few workers, which led to losses from unpicked crops 
and discouraged the investment in worker training needed to raise productivity. A 2005-06 
Seasonal Work Permit pilot program allowed visitors in NZ from visa-waiver countries to work 
up to nine months in areas with government-determined labor shortages.  
Under the RSE, New Zealand employers must try and fail to recruit local workers before 
obtaining permission to recruit guest workers from the Pacific Islands, pay half of the cost of a 
return ticket for Pacific Island migrants, guarantee them work for at least 240 hours and 30 hours 
a week at the minimum wage of NZ$12.10 ($7) an hour, and provide them with housing, health 
insurance and pastoral care, such as transportation for banking and religious services.  Guest 
workers must have passports, health checks, and police clearances and undergo pre-departure 
orientation before departing for New Zealand, where they can remain up to seven months (nine 
months from Kiribati and Tuvalu because of higher travel costs).  
New Zealand employers can recruit Pacific Island workers directly, usually with the help of 
recruitment agents, or select workers from lists prepared by local governments. For example, the 
Tongan government used village committees rank the ―work-ready‖ men and women who 
wanted to work in New Zealand by criteria such as honest and hard working and with some 
English (Gibson, et al, 2008).
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 About 5,000 of Tonga's 67,000 working-age adults registered to 
work in New Zealand in 2008, representing 20 percent of Tongan men between 20 and 60.  
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 Tonga had about 117,000 residents in 2007, when there are about 22,000 Tonga-born persons living in New 
Zealand.  McKenzie surveyed Tongans selected by lottery to move to New Zealand between 2002 and 2005, and 
found that those selected were better off, but not their relatives who remained behind in Tonga. 
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Some 600 Tongans were in New Zealand in March 2008. Most were satisfied, but almost 10 
percent left their jobs before the end of their contracts because there was not sufficient work.
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One reason is that many NZ employers accustomed to hiring Working Holidaymakers, young 
people earning money while touring NZ, underestimated the productivity of Tongan workers and 
requested too many, and some of the Tongans who expected to work six days a week left early 
when work slowed and they were obtaining only 3-4 days of work a week.
84
 There is a 
significant Tongan community in NZ, and if a Tongan seasonal worker does not return by the 
end of the contract, that village is blacklisted and unable to send seasonal workers to NZ in the 
future.  
In Vanuatu, many New Zealand employers used private agents to recruit seasonal workers rather 
than relying on local government lists (McKenzie, et al, 2008). Most of those who came to New 
Zealand from Vanuatu were subsistence farmers with less than 10 years of schooling who had 
better-than-average English and more wealth. Thus, first reports suggest that the RSE is targeting 
the poorest in Tonga more successfully than in Vanuatu. 
By mid-June 2008, some 5,100 RSE migrants were in New Zealand; almost 75 percent were in 
the Hawke’s Bay and Bay of Plenty areas. The largest employer was approved to hire over 400 
RSE migrants, but a third of the 75 farmers requested five or fewer RSE migrants (Ramasamy et 
al, 2008, 182). 
Evaluations suggest the RSE is successful in filling NZ jobs, although there have been 
complaints of workers incurring living costs when there is no work and some employers setting 
piece rates so low that workers earn only the minimum wage rather than more. Piece-rate 
workers normally earn more than the minimum wage, giving them an incentive to work faster, 
but some NZ employers had to raise piece rates so that RSE workers received at least the 
minimum wage.  The development impacts of the RSE are less clear.  In Tonga, workers selected 
to go to New Zealand under the RSE were from poorer rural households who did not have wage 
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 Tonga has 17 districts, and there were reportedly at least two RSE workers from every Tongan district; 71 percent 
from Tongatapu, the island with two-thirds of all Tongans. 
84
Air travel costs between Tonga and NZ have dropped to $275 or less, and some Tongans went home at their own 
expense when work slowed and returned to NZ when there was more work.  
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work at home, but it is not yet clear what impacts their remittances and returns will have on local 
development (Gibson et al, 2008, 203). 
In September 2008, the New Zealand government announced that RSE migrants would be able 
to change employers while in New Zealand.  One survey found that RSE migrants averaged 17 
weeks of work in New Zealand and had average net earnings of NZ$5,700 ($3,400) after paying 
for half of the airfare and their living expenses in New Zealand.  Employers say that, because 
most RSE migrants do not have experience picking fruit and harvesting wine grapes, they must 
invest in training--80 percent of the RSE migrants must return year-after-year to justify these 
training expenses.  
The RSE was launched with the support of the World Bank, which urged Australia and NZ to 
develop temporary worker programs that include having employers and migrants share the cost 
of recruitment and travel, target selection in sending countries on the low-skilled, find the 
balance between a sufficient time abroad for migrants to achieve significant savings but not so 
long that they settle, and guarantee migrants who are good workers and obey program rules the 
right to participate in the future. 
Australia plans its own Pacific Seasonal Workers Pilot Scheme.  The government announced in 
August 2008 that up to 2,500 guest workers from Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu and Papua New 
Guinea could be employed to pick fruit in Victoria's Swan Hill region
85
 and New South Wales’ 
Riverina region for up to seven months a year. As in NZ, farm employers will pay half of the 
workers' round-trip transportation during the three-year trial.  Farmers, who say they need 22,000 
more seasonal workers, argue that up to A$700 million in fruit rots each year for lack of labor to 
pick it. 
With the PSWP, Australia will have a more diverse seasonal hired farm work force, including 
foreign Working Holidaymakers and students as well as recent immigrants and Australians.  
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 Reports from the Swan Hill area suggest that contractors match many foreign-born workers with jobs, and that 
some take advantage of workers who do not understand their rights.  The minimum wage in the area for farm 
workers is supposed to be A$17, but many contractors reportedly pay A$12 and charge workers for housing and 
rides to work.  Most contractors officially receive a five percent commission from the farms to which they supply 
workers, but many augment this commission with other charges levied on workers.  Local reports say that larger 
farms run by investment partnerships are most likely to use reputable contractors. 
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Almost 135,000 Working Holidaymaker visas were issued in 2006-07, plus 250,000 visas to 
foreign students, most of whom can work 20 hours a week while they study. Working 
Holidaymakers are 18- to 30-year olds from industrial countries
86
 who work up to six months for 
one employer while visiting Australia for up to 12 months; they may extend their stay another 12 
months if they work at least three months in agriculture or construction in rural areas (regional 
Australia), which 8,000 did in 2006-07.
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The New Zealand and Australian programs are too new to assess their development impacts, 
although Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean was quoted February 3, 2009 as saying that 
they hoped to expand the PSWP to become a broader, training and workers exchange 
mechanism.  Sending- and receiving-governments clearly hope that these programs will provide 
jobs, savings, and potentially investment to Pacific Islands that need all three while filling 
seasonal jobs in countries that have had booming economies because of the global commodity 
boom. One concrete outcome of the NZ RSE is a reduction in money transfer costs, which were 
at least 15 percent of the amount transferred before the program began and have been reduced as 
governments requested bids for banks to offer dual ATM systems, so that deposits made in NZ 
could be withdrawn in Tonga and elsewhere in local currency at low cost. 
There are development agencies and nonprofit employer coops involved in contracting Pacific 
Island workers, which could increase the development impacts of remittances and avoid turning 
labor contracting into a profit center. Matching remittances that are invested could help to create 
jobs that lead to stay-at-home development in migrant areas of origin. The largest NZ contractor, 
Seasonal Solutions Central Otago (www.jobscentral.co.nz), is an employer coop that can act as 
an employer of seasonal workers and transfer them from farm to farm, reducing down time for 
migrants. 
There are also risks. The RSE and PSWP are structured to foster long-term relationships between 
farm employers and Pacific Island migrants who gain training and experience in seasonal farm 
work. A global economic slowdown could shrink job opportunities just as long lists of Pacific 
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Most Working Holidaymakers are from the UK, Canada and other commonwealth countries, plus South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong in Asia.  
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 Newspapers report that some working holiday makers do not do three months of farm work, and instead pay 
farmers to sign a form saying they have worked for the required three months. 
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Island workers prepare to go abroad. Wages are at least 10 times higher in Australia and New 
Zealand than at home, and returned workers may rest and wait for the next opportunity to earn 
high wages abroad rather than work at home, minimizing development.  Finally, families who 
depend on remittances may reduce work efforts. 
Gulf Countries Kafala 
Most Gulf Cooperation Council (www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index.php) countries require foreigners to 
have a local sponsor (kafala) to enter and leave the country. Sponsors must pay the recruitment 
fees of the migrant workers, cover their health care needs, and obtain iqama or identity cards for 
them. Foreign workers are tied to their employer-sponsor, which means that they must have their 
employer’s permission to change jobs or leave the country.  
The six GCC members have high shares of migrant workers in private sector labor markets. 
Foreigners are a third of Saudi Arabia’s 25 million residents, and foreigners outnumber citizens 
in Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar; Bahrain is the exception, with 51 percent citizens. 
Table 16. GCC Labor Force, 2006 
GCC Labor Force, 2006 
 2006 Per Dist 
Bahrain 360 3% 
Kuwait 1,331 10% 
Oman 764 6% 
Qatar 536 4% 
Saudi Arabia 8,025 59% 
UAE 2,647 19% 
Total 13,663 100% 
Source: GCC: A Statistical Glance April 
2008 
http://library.gcc-
sg.org/English/EPicShow.asp?mycover=43 
 
The kafala system has come under attack from migrant advocates who charge that obtaining 
permission from sponsors to change jobs or leave the country makes migrants overly dependent 
on their sponsors. Beginning in Bahrain, GCC governments have been discussing an end to the 
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kafala system. Bahraini Labor Minister Majeed Al Alawi on April 29, 2008 said that the 
sponsorship (Kafala) system would end in 2009 to curb human trafficking and to liberalize labor 
markets. 
The problem with ending the kafala system is that many GCC residents benefit by charging 
$1,000 or more for sponsorships. Most households in GCC countries are allowed to hire six or 
eight migrants in jobs ranging from gardener and driver to domestic helper.  Even if they employ 
fewer household workers, some households allegedly sell sponsorships for all of the migrants 
they are permitted to employ, and sometimes more, so that arriving migrants wind up in debt and 
unauthorized. 
Worker-paid recruitment fees rise as a share of earnings as skill levels fall, so that much of the 
debate over the kafala system involves foreign workers employed in private homes for $200 a 
month or less. There are no reliable data on the number of domestic helpers. Human Rights 
Watch (2008, 15) estimated 1.5 million in Saudi Arabia in 2008 despite only 480,000 registered 
domestic helpers in the country, citing data from sending countries on deployments of domestic 
helpers and Saudi press reports of two million domestic helpers.
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In GCC countries (and in most industrial countries), persons employed in private homes are 
excluded from labor laws that establish minimum wages, maximum hours, and other labor 
standards.  A major goal of migrant advocates is to extend labor law protections to domestic 
workers, which a draft amendment to the Saudi labor law would do by requiring a maximum 12 
hours of work daily and 72 weekly in private homes. 
One proposed Saudi solution to abuses of the kafala system is to have recruitment agencies 
rather than employers be sponsors of migrant workers.  The Saudi DOL reported there were 350 
recruitment agencies in the country in 2008 and, noting that many have little capital, proposed 
reducing the number of recruiters to three and requiring them to post financial bonds for the 
migrants they sponsor. If implemented, migrant workers would be able to change employers in 
Saudi Arabia, but migrant advocates say they could still be vulnerable to abusive recruiters. 
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Indonesia reported at least 600,000 domestic helpers in Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka 275,000, and the Philippines 
200,000.  There are also domestic helpers from India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Eritrea in Saudi Arabia (Human 
Rights Watch, 2008, 16). 
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Kuwait has implemented a system that makes recruitment agencies the sponsors of migrant 
workers, reportedly with mixed results. 
GCC households pay significant fees to local recruitment agencies to hire domestic helpers, 
gardeners, and other household help, typically equivalent to four to 12 months salary.
89
 Most 
recruiting agents in GCC countries offer households 90-day guarantees, which means that if the 
first domestic helper is not satisfactory, she will be replaced at no additional cost to the 
employer. Many migrants report not being paid during their first three-months abroad to 
encourage them to stay with the employer to whom they have been assigned, since breaking the 
contract could mean going home with no wages (those who break contracts within 90 days to 
return home are to have their return airfare paid by the recruiter).  Some domestic helpers report 
pressure from agents to stay in the household to which they were assigned by promising them 
that things will get better over time. 
Kafala, domestic helpers, and abusive conditions in private homes represent a complex issue 
with no easy answers. GCC governments want the kafala system to ensure that citizens are 
responsible for the foreigners they bring into the country. Most domestic helpers are women in 
their first wage-paying jobs, and the fact that they are employed in private households rather than 
in factories or service establishments means that usual labor and social norms about work may 
not apply. 
The most promising steps to minimize the abuse of foreign domestic helpers in private homes in 
GCC countries include modifying the kafala system to make recruiters solely or jointly liable for 
the migrant workers they bring into the country, strengthening the pre-departure training of 
women so they know their rights abroad, and providing more national and embassy- or 
consulate-related facilities to which abused domestic helpers can turn for assistance. Ultimately, 
development that empowers worker to say no to low wages and abusive conditions is the 
strongest protection. 
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 Kuwaiti domestic helper contracts report employer-paid fees of KD 250 ($960), and salaries for SL domestic 
helpers of KD 45 to 50 a month, making fees equivalent to five months wages, while Saudi households pay more, 
5,000 to 9,000 riyals ($1,300 to $2,340) to hire a domestic helper earning $200 a month, making fees equivalent to a 
year’s wages. Human Rights Watch (2006, 26) reported that Saudi employers paid $750 to $1,600 in fees to hire a 
domestic helper, Kuwaiti employers $1,000 to $1,100, and UAE employers $450 to $1,100. 
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Until development empowers workers who now migrate, several steps could improve wages and 
working conditions and increase the development impacts of migration. A major complaint of 
migrant workers in countries that require employers to pay recruitment fees, as in GCC 
countries, is that employers retain worker passports to discourage runaways, which makes 
migrants vulnerable to police harassment and may limit their ability to send remittances via low-
cost formal channels. Sending countries could issue a second ID similar to the matricula consular 
card issued by many Latin American countries, and then negotiate agreements with regulated 
financial institutions to accept these IDs for banking and similar purposes, to lower remittance 
costs. 
Many Asian countries would like to teach migrant caregivers more skills, such as emergency 
medical skills, and require foreign employers to pay these trained Supermaids higher wages. The 
Philippines’ Supermaid program is widely discussed throughout Asia, since its $400 a month 
minimum wage for women who provide child and elder care and have training in emergency 
medical care is at least twice the prevailing wage for domestic helpers in GCC countries.  The 
$400 minimum has increased salaries for many of the Filipino domestic helpers abroad, but the 
number of new deployments fell sharply, raising numbers and rights trade off issues. 
Economic Contributions: US and Thailand 
Migrants add workers to the labor force, thus increasing employment and economic output.  
Their presence affects economic and labor market conditions in the areas to which they move 
and their absence may be offset by remittances in their areas of origin.   
This section examines the impacts of migrants in areas receiving them.  The major points made 
include: 
 First-wave US studies of the impacts of low-skilled migrants imagined cities to be closed 
labor markets, sought wage depression for US workers similar to the migrants, and did 
not find them. 
 Second-wave studies assumed that internal migration diffused the effects of migrants 
throughout the US labor market, divided the US labor force into education and 
experience cells, and found that migrants depress wages for some low-skill workers if 
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migrants and US workers are assumed to be substitutes, and raise wages if they are 
complements 
 Comparative statics estimates of the contributions of migrants to the Thai economy 
suggest that they add about the same share to GDP as their share of the labor force while 
largely complementing Thai workers 
US Studies 
Most economic research on the impacts of immigrants on labor markets and economies has 
focused on industrial countries, especially the US, which has about 38 million or 20 percent of 
the world’s 191 million migrants. Demographers have converged on the number of unauthorized 
foreigners in the US, about 12 million (Passel, 2006), but economists have not reached consensus 
on the economic impacts of the roughly eight million in the US labor force.
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In a simple two-factor production function with homogeneous labor and constant returns to scale, 
adding immigrants reduces wages in the short run (assuming full employment), but there is no 
change in the long-run return to labor and capital.  If labor is heterogeneous, the arrival of 
immigrants has long-run distributional consequences, helping complementary workers and 
hurting those who are substitutes. 
Studies of the impacts of migrants on receiving-area labor markets began with efforts to compare 
wage and unemployment rates in cities with more and fewer migrants.  The hypothesis was 
straightforward: if adding more workers via migration puts downward pressure on wages, 
upward pressure on unemployment rates, or both, cities with more migrants should have lower 
wages or higher unemployment rates, especially for workers most similar to the migrants. 
However, Card’s study (1990) of the Miami labor market after the 1980 Mariel boatlift found 
that the unemployment rate in Miami rose slower between 1979 and 1981 despite the sudden 
eight percent jump in the labor force than in comparison cities that did not attract additional 
migrant workers. 
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 For a non-technical explanation of the economics debate over the impact of immigrant in US labor markets, see 
Roger Lowenstein, "The Immigration Equation," New York Times, July 9, 2006 
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Three explanations were offered for the apparent gap between the theory that adding to the 
supply of labor puts downward pressure on wages and empirical studies that could not find 
migrant-depressing wage effects. First, migrants are mobile. If they move to cities that are 
adding jobs, then immigration, employment, and wages can rise together even if e.g. wages 
would have risen even faster in the absence of immigration. Second, US workers may move 
away from ―migrant cities‖ or not move to them, spreading any negative effect of migrants on 
wages throughout the US labor market and making it hard to measure migrant effects in cities 
with high shares.   Third, there may be measurement errors in city comparisons.  For example, 
many of the studies focus on the wages or unemployment rates of Black workers, who in 
―migrant cities‖ may be disproportionately employed by government, sheltering their wages 
from immigrant competition 
Borjas (2003) emphasized that adding to the supply of labor puts downward pressure on wages, 
following traditional comparative statics analysis. Because of US worker mobility, Borjas 
believes that migrant impacts on local workers must be assessed at the national level rather than 
in comparisons of cities with more and fewer migrants. Using a 3-level CES production function, 
Borjas grouped workers into four education and eight work experience groups, viz, less than high 
school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduates, with work experience 
measured in five-year increments.  Borjas estimated that the wages of all US workers fell about 
3.4 percent between 1980 and 2000 as a result of immigration in the short run, but only high-
school dropouts experienced significant wage drops in the long run, down almost five percent 
even after capital adjusted to the larger labor force (Borjas and Katz, 2005). 
Other researchers have extended this approach of grouping workers by their education and work 
experience to estimate the impacts of migrants on local workers in particular age and experience 
groups.  Ottaviano and Peri (2007) extended the Borjas approach in two ways: they allowed 
migrants and US-born workers to be complements within education and age cells, and they 
allowed capital to adjust to the availability of additional workers in the short run.  Using the 
same basic age and experience model, they find that migration has positive rather than negative 
effects on the wages of US workers.  However, the fact that US workers wages rise with 
immigration means that the wages of previous migrants in the same education and work 
experience cell fall significantly. 
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The first phase of US studies of migration’s labor market impacts involved comparisons of cities 
with more and fewer migrants, with the major result that there were few negative effects of 
immigrants on US-born workers.  The current phase involves separating US- and foreign-born 
workers within education and experience cells and estimating the effects of foreign-born on US-
born workers.  If US- and foreign-born workers are assumed to be substitutes, and if capital is 
assumed to be fixed, there are signification negative wage effects.  However, if foreign-born 
workers are complements to US-born workers, and if capital is allowed to adjust to the larger 
labor force, the wages of US-born workers rise in most education-experience cells, but there are 
significant drops in immigrant wages as immigrants compete with each other. 
Thai Studies 
There are few studies of the impacts of migrants on the economies of developing countries. 
However, debates over migration in Thailand prompted several exploratory efforts to assess the 
economic impacts of migrants there. 
The Thai labor force of 36 million in 2007 included 1.8 million migrants, five percent. The 
migrants were concentrated by area, industry, and occupation, with most in low-skilled jobs in 
Bangkok and the southern areas of Thailand in agriculture and fisheries, construction, 
manufacturing, and services such as domestic workers. The number of migrants and the range of 
occupations, industries, and areas in which they are employed have been increasing.  
In 1995, when 750,000 migrants were 2.2 percent of the Thai labor force, the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI) estimated that migrants increased Thai GDP by one-half 
of one percent, contributing $839 million of the then $168 billon Thai GDP at current prices, and 
$600 million of then $120 billion Thai GDP in 2000 constant dollars (Sussangkarn, 1996). If the 
1995 SAM-CGE relationships remained valid in 2005, when migrants were five percent of the 
Thai labor force, the migrant contribution would be 1.25 percent of Thai GDP, $2 billion at 
current prices or $1.8 billion in 2000 constant dollars. 
Another way to estimate the contributions of migrants to Thai GDP is to estimate the value 
added by migrants in each sector of the economy and make assumptions about the average 
output of each migrant. If 25 percent of migrants are in agriculture, 15 percent in fisheries, 40 
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percent in industry (including construction), and 20 percent are in services, and if migrants are 
half as productive as the Thais employed in these sectors, migrants would account for 3.1 percent 
of Thai GDP in 2005. If migrants were equally productive, their contribution would double to 6.2 
percent of GDP. 
In most cases, migrants complement Thai workers, as when migrants on fishing boats increase 
the productivity of Thai boat captains, boat builders, and others in upstream and downstream 
industries. There may also be instances of substitution between migrants and Thai workers, as 
when construction firms hire migrants rather than Thais because the migrants are willing to work 
more hours or months and at lower wages.  Most analysis suggests that migrants fill jobs that 
became less desirable as Thais gained more options in a growing economy, including migrating 
abroad. In some cases, ―migrant jobs‖ were created by subsidized foreign and domestic 
investments, most notably in agriculture and garments in Thai provinces along the Burmese 
border. 
Thailand has the problem of managing migrant workers because its economic success enabled 
internal migrants who once filled low-skill jobs to find better opportunities in Thailand or 
abroad.  Thai employers turned to migrants from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia to replace 
previous internal migrants as well as to fill newly-created jobs in Thailand’s expanding 
economy.  Thailand’s migrant worker policies assumed that the need for migrants would be 
short-lived despite periodic re-registrations of migrants that demonstrated that some occupations, 
industries, and areas had become ―structurally dependent‖ on migrants. 
Internal Migration 
This section deals with internal rural-urban migration in the Asia-Pacific region. Between 1950 
and 2000, the number of Asians living in urban areas increased five-fold, from about 230 million 
to 1.2 billion, and the United Nations projects that over half of Asians will live in urban areas by 
2030 (UN, 2002). In 1950, less than 20 percent of Asian residents lived in urban areas, and rates 
of urbanization were similar across regions. Urbanization is expected to proceed fastest in East 
Asia and slowest in South-central Asia, with significant differences between regions by 2030. 
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Table 17. Urban Residents in Asia, 1950, 2000, 2030 (mils) 
 1950 2000 2030 
Asia 230 1,254 2,441 
 Eastern Asia 121 617 1,065 
 South-central Asia 83 441 969 
 Southeastern Asia 26 196 407 
Urban Share of Total Population (percent) 
 1950 2000 2030 
Asia 17 35 52 
 Eastern Asia 18 42 63 
 South-central Asia 17 30 44 
 Southeastern Asia 15 38 56 
Source: United Nations, 2002  
 
Perhaps the most studied internal migration underway is in China. At least 10 percent of Chinese 
are internal migrants, some 130 million, meaning they are living and often working away from the 
place in which they are registered.  Most have moved from rural areas in the center and western 
parts of China to cities and coastal provinces in the east. 
The Chinese government introduced the hukou household registration system in the 1950s, first to 
allocate grain and later to regulate internal migration (Chan, 1999). As a result, Chinese are 
generally registered in their place of birth, and it is often difficult to change registration from one 
place to another.  Especially low-skilled migrants may find it difficult to access  to government 
services that range from housing to education to health care when they are away from the place 
where they are registered-- access to public services is generally confined to the place in which 
the hukou says the individual is registered.   
In 1978, before market reforms began, about 70 percent of Chinese were employed in agriculture, 
which generated 28 percent of GDP.  By 2006, only 43 percent of the 760 million Chinese 
workers were employed in agriculture, which generated 12 percent of GDP. Most estimates find 
that up to half of the 327 million agricultural workers in China are redundant.  However, many 
"surplus rural workers" are over 40 and less attractive to urban employers than younger rural-
urban migrants.  
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There is an economic reason to move from rural to urban China. In 2006, urban residents had an 
average income of 10,500 yuan ($1,400), compared with 3,300 yuan ($440) in rural areas. About 
350 million Chinese, a quarter, had urban hukous in 2008, while 950 million had rural hukous. 
However, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction reported that 45 percent of 
Chinese, about 600 million people, lived in cities in 2008, reflecting significant rural-urban 
migration.  Not all of those who are living in urban places while registered in rural places are 
workers—estimates of the number of persons registered in rural areas and working in urban areas 
in 2008 range from 150 million to 200 million.  The number of rural-urban migrant workers has 
been rising—it was about 30 million in 1982, 54 million in 1995, and 140 million in 2004. 
Most of the 110 million workers employed in Chinese manufacturing are internal rural-urban 
migrants, as are most of China's construction workers.  About 70 percent of China's internal 
migrants are between 15 and 35. Migrants earn lower wages than urban residents, an average 540 
yuan ($80) a month in 2004, compared to 1,350 yuan for registered urban residents.  Remittances 
from urban to rural China are estimated to exceed $80 billion a year. With more couples 
migrating,  more children are left with relatives in rural areas. In 2008, an estimated 58 million 
children under 17 lived in rural areas without either parent. 
The Chinese central government has been debating whether to loosen or abolish the hukou 
system. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January 2008 
recommended that the household registration system be ended within five years so that internal 
Chinese migrants have the same benefits in employment, education, healthcare and housing as 
local residents. The NRDC, which said a "free flow" of migrants from rural to urban areas would 
maintain rapid economic growth, estimated that 43 percent of China's 1.3 billion residents lived 
in cities, including 200 million rural-urban migrants. 
However, the most recent review by the Ministry of Public Security in 2005 concluded that local 
governments would have to extend to migrants the right to housing, education and health care, 
which would cost money.  The central government recently ordered urban schools to accept 
migrant children and not charge fees for K-9 education.  However, some urban schools levy 
other fees, prompting some migrant parents not to enroll their children in regular public 
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schools.
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 Cui Chuanyi, a rural development researcher at the State Council, China's Cabinet, 
said in 2007 that "Very few migrants sever their ties to the farm, not because they don't want to 
move but because their human rights in the cities are not protected." 
Some local governments are making it easier for rural-urban migrants. Shenzhen, which has 2.1 
million registered residents and eight million migrant workers, in July 2008 became the first 
Chinese city to offer "citizenship" to migrants.  Residents ages 16 to 60 who have been living in 
the area at least 30 days but are registered elsewhere can obtain 10-year residence certificate 
smart cards that allow them to apply for driving licenses and business visas to visit Hong Kong 
or Macao.  Children of residence certificate cards will be able to go to local public schools, and 
their families can apply to live in low-cost public housing. 
China is often called the world's factory, reflecting the huge quantities of toys, clothes and other 
goods assembled in urban and coastal factories, often by migrant workers.
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  China's government 
wants its factories to move up the value ladder, and is encouraging them to do so by introducing 
and enforcing tougher labor and environmental standards and reducing tax breaks for low-end 
assembly operations.  Industries targeted to move up the economic ladder include software and 
biotechnology, automobiles, medical devices and supercomputers.  
Unions have become more active among migrant workers. The All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions reported in October 2008 that 210 million of the 900 million rural Chinese were rural-
urban migrants, and 65 million migrant workers were members of ACFTU unions.  The ACFTU 
reported a total 209 million members, up from 170 million in 2007 due to a summer 2008 
campaign to persuade more foreign firms to recognize ACFTU unions, including Wal-Mart 
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Fees for unofficial primary school in urban areas are often $25 or $50 a month.  Current law requires high-school 
students seeking to attend college to take entrance exams in the place they are registered to live. Most children who 
move to urban areas with their parents reportedly drop out of school.  
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 The World Bank recalculated China's GDP in December 2007, concluding it was lower than previously estimated.  
The new calculations put per capita GDP at $1,721 in 2005, or $4,091 at purchasing-power parity, largely because 
prices in China are closer to world levels than was previously believed.  Critics said that the new estimates rely too 
much on the assumption that prices in rural China reflect prices on the fringes of Chinese cities.  If rural prices are 
lower than the new data assume, the World Bank will have reduced its estimate of China's GDP too much. 
The number of poor people in China was raised from 100 million to 300 million by the new World Bank estimates.  
In mountainous and desert regions, and in areas dominated by ethnic minorities, many rural people are poor, such as 
the part of southern Henan Province.  Henan Province has 100 million residents, more than any other, and produces 
mostly grains rather than higher profit fruits and vegetables and fish.  Many officials assume that rural families can 
live off remittances sent by family members who migrated to coastal provinces next door to work in factories 
producing goods for export. 
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(83,000 employees in China), and Yum Brands (160,000 employees in China).  The share of 
foreign firms with unionized employees rose from 50 percent to 90 percent between 2007 and 
2008. 
A combination of factory closures and rising grain prices may reverse rural-urban migration in 
2009. Some 10 million migrants laid off from their urban jobs returned to their rural homes in 
December 2008, well before the usual Chinese New Year return period.  The Year of the Ox 
begins on January 26, 2009, and many of the migrants who return to their villages for the 
holidays may remain there if they do not have urban jobs to which they can return.  The Chinese 
government urged some laid-off migrants to remain in cities and retrain for new jobs, and 
announced stimulus policies to maintain urban economic growth and jobs. 
Conclusions 
The number of international migrants—people living outside their country of citizenship—
reached 191 million in 2005, meaning that three percent of the world’s people had left their 
country of birth for a year or more.  The number of migrants is likely to continue increasing 
because of demand-pull factors in receiving countries, supply-push factors in sending countries, 
and networks that create communications and transportation infrastructures and allow migrants 
to learn about opportunities abroad and move to take advantage of them.  Trying to manage 
migration by adjusting migrant rights, as when governments make it harder to apply for asylum 
or restrict migrant access to welfare benefits, can violate fundamental human rights and 
encourage smuggling and trafficking in people.  
Every one of the world’s 200 countries participates in the international migration system as a 
destination for migrants, a country through which migrants transit, or an area of origin--many 
participate in all three ways. Most migrants do not move far from home, and each of the world’s 
continents has a migration system with unique characteristics, including the large number of 
unauthorized migrants in the US, the unexpected settlement of guest workers in Europe, and the 
very high shares contract foreign workers in private sector labor markets in the oil-exporting 
countries in western Asia. 
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The migration system in the Asia-Pacific region is unique in several respects. First, there are 
relatively fewer migrants than in Europe or North America, reflecting the fact that most 
destination countries are not open to immigrants and that in very large countries what may be 
international migration elsewhere is internal migration, as in China.  Second, Asian labor-
receiving countries have very different policies toward low-skill migrants, ranging from 
Singapore’s strict regulation of low-skill migrants considered to be workers while employed in 
the country to Japan’s use of foreign trainees to the Gulf countries reliance on local sponsorship 
and contracts to rotate migrants in and out of destination areas.  Third, the major labor-sending 
countries seek to send more skilled migrants to destinations outside Asia in a bid to improve 
protections and increase remittances. 
Migration is usually a journey of hope. The higher earnings achieved by most Asian migrants are 
generally positive for human development, enabling individuals and their families to improve 
their housing and levels of consumption as well as to invest in the health and education of their 
children. Women are the majority of migrants leaving many Asian nations, and their foreign 
earnings often empower them in traditional rural societies. However, returned migrants rarely 
form political organizations that advocate changes that may make migration unnecessary in the 
future.  Instead, migration acts more often as a safety valve in labor-sending countries. 
Labor migration is a process to be managed, not a problem to be solved. Experience 
demonstrates that there is no universal best way to manage labor migration, but there are 
universal principles that can protect the human rights of migrants and local workers. Policies that 
adhere to fundamental principles and are flexible enough to change with circumstances offer the 
most promise.  
This means that destination governments that acknowledge migrants are likely to continue to be 
employed in the medium term and create mechanisms to involve the social partners in the 
development of a transparent migrant worker policy and promote cooperation with migrant 
countries of origin are most likely to reap the benefits of migration while protecting the rights of 
migrants and local workers.  In labor-sending countries, governments that aim to protect their 
nationals during recruitment and while abroad from unscrupulous agents and employers, and 
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cooperate to reduce the cost of remittances, can help to maximize the human development 
impacts of the window of opportunity opened by migration. 
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